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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the professional sports industry still pales in compari-
son to that of many other non-sports businesses,' its magnitude can-
not be doubted, the National Football League (NFL), Major
League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA)
and the National Hockey League (NHL), collectively known as the
"Big Four", generate over nineteen billion dollars in revenue annu-
ally.2 Undoubtedly, the most important components of the prod-
uct that is professional sports are the professional athletes
themselves. Consequently, the collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs) of the Big Four ensure, in both direct and indirect ways,
that the players receive over fifty percent of gross revenues, 3 at aver-
1. GLENN M. WONG, THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CAREERS IN SPORTS 5-6
(Glenn M. Wong, ed., Jones & Bartlett Publishers 1st ed. 2009) (2008).
2. See also Chris Isidore, Baseball Close to Catching NFL as Top $ Sport, CNN, Oct.
25, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/25/commentary/sportsbiz/index.htm
(noting how MLB generates over $6 billion annually); see Tripp Mickle, Escrow Cash
Will Boost NHL, SPORTS BUSINESSJOURNAL, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.sportsbusiness
journal.com/art./61684 (establishing that NHL generates approximately $2.64 bil-
lion annually); see Bryan Curtis, The National Pastime(s), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at
WK5 (reporting that NFL generates $7 billion in annual revenue); see John
Lombardo, NBA Increases Shared Revenue by 63 Percent, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL,
Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/art./58828 (discussing an-
nual revenue of NBA as $3.5 billion).
3. See NFL CBA, art. XXIV, §3 (2006), available at http://www.nflpa.com/
About-us/CBA-Download/ (guaranteeing players fifty percent of Total Revenue
(TR)); see NBA CBA, art. VII, §2 (2005), available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/
2005 (setting team salary caps at fifty-one percent of Basketball Income (BRI)); see
NHL CBA, art. 50.4 (2005), available at http://www.nhl.com/ice/
page.htm?id=26366 (guaranteeing players fifty-seven of Hockey Related Revenues
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DISABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES IN SPORTS
age salaries ranging from $1.4 million in the NFL to $5.34 million
in the NBA.4
Considering the salaries of professional athletes, investments
made into their performance, and their potential earnings, it is not
surprising that both teams and players seek disability insurance.
This Comment will give examples of athletes and teams that might
seek out disability insurance followed by an discussion of the basics
of insurance, the underwriting process and the insurance policy.
Next, the Comment will discuss some of the creative options used
in disability insurance policies and the perspectives of the individu-
als and organizations involved in professional sports. After examin-
ing the few cases in which professional athlete disability insurance
policies have been litigated, the Comment concludes by stressing
that sports practitioners recognize the importance of this emerging
issue and educate themselves accordingly.
A. The Athlete
In recent years, through a series of national television commer-
cials, the NCAA has touted that the vast majority of its student-ath-
letes eventually "go pro in something other than sports. ' '5 In fact
the NCAA estimates that only about 2.0% of NCAA football student-
athletes play professional football and that about 1.3% of NCAA
men's basketball student-athletes ever play professional basketball. 6
Nevertheless, the average salaries of professional athletes indicate
that a career as a professional athlete will earn you far more money
than nearly all other professions. 7.
John Wall enrolled at the University of Kentucky in the fall of
2009 as one of the highest-ranked freshman basketball player in the
(HRR)). It is important to note that TR, BRI and HRR are all defined differently
and do not necessarily include the same revenue streams across all leagues.
4. See Glenn M. Wong, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAw §1.2.1 (Greenwood Publish-
ing Group, 4th ed. 2010) (discussing range of average salaries across various
sports).
5. Jeff Zillgitt, TV Ads for NCAA Will Get Plenty of Playing Time; New Brand-
ing campaign Aims to Get Group's Message to Public, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 2007,
at 2E.
6. See NCAA, A CAREER IN PROFESSIONAL ATHLETICS: A GUIDE FOR MAKING THE
TRANSITION 38 (Aug. 2004) (listing statistics regarding probability of competing in
athletics beyond high school). In addition, the NCAA estimates only 1.0% of wo-
men's basketball student-athletes play professionally, 10.5% of baseball student-
athletes play professionally, 4.1% of men's ice hockey student-athletes play profes-
sionally and 1.9% of men's soccer student-athletes play professionally. See id.
7. See Wong, supra note 4, at 13 (recognizing high salary professional athletes
receive compared to other professions).
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country.8 If it weren't for the NBA eligibility rules, he may very well
have skipped college altogether and declared himself eligible for
the 2009 NBA Draft.9 Some predict that Wall will be a "one-and-
done" candidate, opting for the NBA Draft after just one season of
college basketball. 10 While Wall does receive scholarships and
other benefits worth tens of thousands of dollars, he will not be
receiving the multi-million dollar salary of an NBA player while in
college. Playing for new Kentucky head coach John Calipari in
front of one of the most rabid fan bases in sports, Wall will be ex-
pected to give maximum effort towards a national championship.11
Yet some people question whether it is in Wall's best interests to put
his physical health at risk so that his school can reap millions of
dollars from his effort, while an injury may put his professional ca-
reer at risk. 12
To combat this inherent conflict and to help prevent student-
athletes from leaving school early for the professional ranks, largely
as a result of undue influence from agents, the NCAA established
the Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance (ESDI) Pro-
gram in 1990.13 The ESDI program, discussed in greater detail
later in the article, helps student-athletes projected to have profes-
8. See ESPN, ESPNU 100, http://insider.espn.go.com/ncb/recruiting/
tracker/espnulOO?&season=2009 (Feb. 10, 2010) (ranking incoming college fresh-
men basketball players and naming where they are attending college). John Wall
was ranked number five out of one hundred athletes listed. See id.
9. See NBA CBA, supra note 3, at art. X (requiring that for American players,
at least one NBA Season must have elapsed since players' graduation from high
school).
10. See Brett Dawson, Three Years Later, Colleges Cooling To NBA Draft
Rule, THE COUIUERJ.,July 11, 2009 (mentioning briefly that John Wall is expected to leave
college for NBA after one-season minimum); see Bryan Burwell, Is One College Year
Enough? NBA's 'One-and-Done' Rule Comes Under Scrutiny, ST. Louis PosT-DIs-
PATCH, June 26, 2009, at CI (determining, after considering arguments on both
sides, that NBA's one-and-done rule is positive for players and coaches and, should
perhaps be extended to two years); see John Rohde, Big 12 Coaches Would Like to
See One-and-Done Rule Go, THE OKLAHOMAN,June 25, 2009, at IC (reporting that
much debate appears to be among colleges and not NBA officials who seem rather
impartial to one-and-done rule).
11. See Dawson, supra note 10 (describing Calipari as Kentucky's head coach).
12. See, e.g., Gene Wojciechowski, Soak Up the One-and-Done Experience of Love,
ESPN COMMENTARY, Mar. 28, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/
story?columnist=Wojciechowski-gene&id=3316618&sportCat=ncb (mentioning in-
jury risk of playing college basketball as incentive to go to professional level after
only one season).
13. See NCAA Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance, http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM-GLOBALCONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/
About+The+NCAA/Budget+and+Finances/Insurance/exceptional.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2010) (describing student-athlete insurance policy costs, benefits, and
application process).
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sional careers obtain insurance policies against potentially career-
ending injuries. 14
B. The Club
Most of the contracts in MLB, the NBA and the NHL are guar-
anteed, in the sense that if a player is injured or is cut from the
team for skill or salary cap purposes, he is still paid the remaining
value of the contract.15 Guaranteed compensation (e.g. signing bo-
nuses and other up-front cash payments) is one of the most conten-
tious issues in the NFL, and almost 50% of compensation in the
NFL is guaranteed.1 6 Considering that the Big 4 dish out close to
$10 billion in player compensation annually, it makes sense that a
team would want to insure itself against a player's possible injury.17
Prior to the 2009 season, the New York Yankees signed free
agent first baseman Mark Teixeira to an eight-year, $180-million
contract. 18 Barring a few extreme circumstances under which a
team may void a contract, Teixeira s is guaranteed $180 million. 19
It should be noted that it is common, especially in the NFL, for
teams to require players to sign injury waivers, releasing the team
from future financial obligations in the case a player reinjures a
14. For a further discussion of the ESDI, see infta notes 191-208 and accompa-
nying text.
15. See generally NBA CBA, supra note 5 (describing terms of player contracts
including provision providing for payment of balance of contract even if unable to
play); see generally NHL CBA, supra note 3 (describing terms of player contracts
including provision providing for payment of balance of contract even if unable to
play).
16. See Chris Deubert & Glenn M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of Signing
Bonuses and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the 2011
Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 16 UCLA Err. L. REv. 179, 200-01 (2009) (sug-
gesting ways in which guaranteed pay and bonuses may be avoided in NFL
contracts).
17. For a discussion of annual revenues and percentage of revenue paid as
compensation, see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
18. See Kat O'Brien, Yanks Tiy Again, Succeed at First; Reach Agreement with Tei-
xeira for Eight Years, $180 million, NEWSDAY, Dec. 24, 2008, at A50 (reporting on
Yankees's acquisition of Teixeria along with two other top picks who will likely
propel Yankees to top of league).
19. See id. (discussing terms of Yankee contract).
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preexisting condition. 20 Insurance policies generally cover sixty to
eighty percent of a contract's total value.21
There have been several high profile cases of teams purchasing
insurance on a player's contract with varying degrees of success, in-
cluding the New Jersey Nets on forward Jayson Williams, 22 the Balti-
more Orioles on outfielder Albert Belle,23 the New York Mets on
first baseman Mo Vaughn, 24 and the Minnesota Twins on outfielder
20. See Harvery Fialkov, Veteran Receiver Glenn Being Considered, S. FLA. SUN-SEN-
TINEL, July 30, 2008, at 6C (noting how Glenn, who had recently undergone two
surgeries on his right knee, refused to sign injury waiver and was released); see
Nancy Gay, Newberry Signs with Raiders, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 7, 2007, at D3 (indicating
that when Newberry joined Raiders he signed injury waiver to protect team from
his well-documented knee problems); see Mike Reiss, Dwight is Looking for the Biggest
Return, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 2006, at C2 (establishing that when Dwight signed
with Patriots his agreement included general injury waiver).
21. See T.J. Quinn, Paying For It, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 25, 2001 (reporting on
increasing insurance costs to sports teams due to more frequent player injuries).
In 2001, "insurance premiums for major contracts [went] up an average of 250%."
Id.
22. For a discussion of the high-profile insurance claim regardingJayson Wil-
liams, see infra note 309 and accompanying text.
23. See La Velle E. Neal III, Major League Baseball Insider; Insuring Contracts
Getting Expensive, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 29, 2001, at IOC (reporting that Orioles
stood to collect $27.3 million on Belle's $39 million contract after Belle retired
with hip injury). Though Belle was unable to play since 2000 because of his hip
injury, the Orioles were forced to keep him on their 40-man roster until 2003 to
collect on the insurance payments. See Joe Christensen and Roch Kubatko, O's
waive Maduro, Cut Brock, 3 others; Likes of Belle, Bedard Fill Opened Roster Slot,
THE BALTIMoRE SUN, Oct. 2, 2002, at 3D. Prior to the 1999 season, Belle signed a
five-year, $65 million contract with the Orioles. See id. During the spring training
of 2001, Belle announced his retirement from the game due to a degenerative hip
condition. See id. The Orioles were only responsible for $11.7 million of the $39
million remaining on Belle's guaranteed contract. See id. However, the Orioles
were forced to keep Belle on their 40-man roster to collect on the insurance pay-
ments, which they did through the 2003 season. See Murry Chass, Front Office
Changes, But Will the Pirates?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at 8 (mentioning Belle's
contract and subsequent injury that forced team to keep Belle on injured list for
three years to collect insurance payments).
24. See Sam Borden, If Mo's Done, Mets Cash In, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 8, 2003
(discussing possibility of Vaughn leaving Mets and result this would have on Mets
in terms of insurance payments). Vaughn, a player for the New York Mets, battled
nagging injuries throughout his short tenure with the Mets before leaving the
game for good on May 2, 2003. See id. Years of weighing over 250 pounds did
Vaughn in as he considered options for his arthritic left knee. See id. Once
Vaughn had not played for 90 consecutive days, the Mets began to recoup 75% of
Vaughn's remaining 2003 salary. See id. While Vaughn never played again, be-
cause he never filed retirement papers with the league, the Mets kept him on the
roster through 2004 to collect 75% of the nearly $29 million Vaughn was still
owed. See Dave Caldwell, Vaughn Is Out for the Year And Is Unlikely to Return, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at D5 (noting potential insurance recovery for Mets after
Vaughn leaves baseball). The Mets exercised a $2 million buyout of Vaughn's con-
tract prior to the 2005 season.
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Kirby Puckett.25 Several disputes between teams and insurance
companies over high-profile player contracts have been settled with-
out terms being disclosed, including the Boston Bruins on forward
Cam Neely26, the Houston Astros on first baseman Jeff Bagwell
27
and the Los Angeles Dodgers on Kevin Brown.
28
C. The Athlete and The Club
As explained earlier, nearly all contracts in MLB, the NBA and
the NHL are fully guaranteed. 29 Nevertheless, some professional
athletes may still find it in their best interests to seek out disability
insurance. For example, LeBron James, a perennial All-Star, MVP
candidate and one of the NBA's biggest stars entered the 2009-10
season as an impending free agent, assuming he doesn't exercise a
25. See Sid Hartman, Puckett Insurance Helpful to Twins, STAR TRIB., July 16,
1996, at 3C (comparing premium payments made on Puckett's contract to return
for team). Once Puckett had missed 60 days of the 1996 season the Twins began
to collect 50% of Puckett's remaining 1996 salary, which amounted to an insur-
ance collection of roughly $2 million. See id. The Twins collected insurance on
50% of Puckett's salary for the first 60 days of the 1997 season and 75% of his
salary for the remainder of that season. See id. The Twins saved $4.67 million in
1997 through this insurance arrangement. See id.
26. For a discussion on Cam Neely's insurance settlement following litigation
regarding payment for the claim, see infra notes 321 and accompanying text.
27. See Astros' Insurance Claim on Bagwell Denied, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/nl/astros/2006-03-28-
bagwell-claim-deniedx.htm (reporting on insurance claim denial for Bagwell's in-
jury). With Bagwell due $17 million in salary for the 2006 season, the Astros filed
an insurance claim seeking to recover $15.6 million of Bagwell's guaranteed 2006
salary by claiming that Bagwell was too disabled to play. See id. In March of 2006,
however, the insurance company ruled against the Astros, claiming "that there had
been no adverse change in Mr. Bagwell's condition between the end of last season
and the date the policy terminated." Id. In December 2006, the Astros and Con-
necticut General Life Insurance Co. settled the case with terms undisclosed. See
Wells in Elite Company; $126M Deal Sixth Largest in History, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec.
17, 2006, at 2C (confirming out-of-court settlement between Astros and insurance
company regarding Bagwell contract).
28. See Louinn Lota, Dodgers Sue Insurance Company Over Brown's Injuries,
UNION TRIB., Apr. 8, 2003, available at http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/sports/
baseball/20030407-2120-bbn-dodgerslawsuit.html (describing lawsuit for payment
of insurance to cover losses on Brown's contract due to his injury). Prior to the
1999 season the Dodgers and Brown agreed to a seven-year, $105 million contract.
See id. After injuries limited Brown to only 29 starts in 2001 and 2002 the Dodgers
filed for an insurance claim, and then filed suit. See id. The case was settled with
terms undisclosed. See id.; see generally L.A. Dodgers Inc v. Hartford Life Ins. Co,
2:03-cv-02442 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2003) (noting controversy between Dodgers and
insurance company regarding payment on remainder of Brown's contract).
29. For a further discussion of contract guarantees, see supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
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player option for the 2010-11 season.3 0 In free agency, the contract
James will sign will almost certainly be a "maximum" contract
within the meaning of the NBA CBA.31 With one season remaining
on his contract at a salary of about $15.8 million, LeBron stands
one major injury away from potentially losing dozens of millions of
dollars in free agency.32 Consequently, James and many athletes in
a similar position may seek out insurance policies based on pros-
pected future earnings. At the same time, the Cavaliers have an in-
surable interest in the year remaining onJames's contract. 33 There
are often scenarios in professional sports where an impending free
agent has insurable interest in his potential contract but at the same
time the team wants to insure the large salary the player is currently
earning.34
The NFL presents a different situation that the other Big Four.
Due to the non-guaranteed nature of most NFL compensation,
some players may seek out insurance policies on their own.3 5 One
of the most notable cases was former Redskins quarterbackJoe The-
ismann, who cashed in on a $1.4 million policy after a career-end-
ing broken leg in 1985.36 In general, NFL players are entitled to
30. See Free Agents: 2008 and 2009, ESPN, Nov. 3, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.
com/nba/news/story?page=FreeAgents-09-10 (discussing James' potential free
agency).
31. See NBA CBA, supra note 3 at art. IX (limiting player contracts to five
seasons or six if players resign with their former club); see also id at art. II, §7 (re-
stricting players' maximum annual salary to twenty-five to thirty percent of league
salary cap, depending on years in league). The 2008-09 NBA Salary Cap was
$58.68 million. See NBA Salary Cap for 2008-09 Season, http://www.nba.com/
news/salarycapset_.080709.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (discussing salary cap for
2008-09 season).
32. See Sportige, NBA Top Ten Highest Player Salaries for 2009-2010, http://spor-
tige.com/2009-2010-biggest-contracts/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) (listing top NBA
player salaries) [Rule 18.2.3 (c)]; see also Mike Starkey, LeBron James Will Keep Con-
tract Options Open Regarding Extension with Cleveland Cavaliers, CLEVELAND.COM, Aug.
7, 2009, http://www.cleveland.com/cavs/index.ssf/2009/08/lebron-james-will
keep_contrac.html (stating that Lebron James has one more year left on his
contract).
33. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §41:25 (3d
ed. 2009) (defining insurable interest).
34. See id. (recognizing when one has insurable interest).
35. For a further discussion on the non-guaranteed nature of NFL contracts,
see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36. See Chrstine Brennan, Insurance Could Bring Theismann $1.4 Million;
Quarterback Appears Unlikely to Be Ready for Redskins' Training Camp, WASH. POST,
June 10, 1986, at DI (reporting injury and insurance pay out given to Thiesmann
after his career ending injury); see also Theismann Opts for Waiver List, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1986, at 45 (addressing Theismann's career-ending injury that was able to
get him huge payout from insurance). Theismann's right leg was badly broken in
a 1985 game against the New York Giants. When he failed his 1986 preseason phys-
ical, he was placed on waivers, set to earn a $650,000 salary and a $600,000 roster
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some portion of their scheduled compensation if they are cut, but
certainly not the balance of their multi-year contracts as in other
sports.3 7
II. BASICS OF INSURANCE
In general, insurance provides coverage or protection in the
event that something goes wrong.38 Insurance can cover loss or
theft of property, health issues (dental problems, broken legs, etc.)
personal liability (involvement in an auto accident), damage to
property (a house), death (life insurance) and disability (injury
preventing one from working).39
Another way of looking at this is that the decision to purchase
insurance is shifting risk to the insurance company.40 For example,
if there is a theft of $20,000 worth of your personal property, and
you have insurance, then the insurance company has assumed the
risk and will pay you $20,000.41
A premium is "[t] he periodic payment required to keep an in-
surance policy in effect. '42 A deductible is "the portion of the loss
to be borne by the insured before the insurer becomes liable for
payment. '43 Therefore, if as part of your insurance policy you paid
a premium of $1,000 and have a deductible of $2,500, for the year
bonus if he were on the active roster for the entire season. In 1984 Theismann
had signed a $1.4 million career-ending injury insurance policy with Lloyd's of
London. When Theismann failed physicals in 1986 and 1987, he was able to col-
lect on the policy.
37. See NFL CBA, art. X, INJURY GRIEVANCE (2006), available at http://
static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-2012.pdf (permit-
ting injured player that was cut to recoupis weekly salary for number of weeks
injury would have prevented him from playing (each team has several "injury set-
tlements" each season)); see also NFL CBA, ART. XII, INJURY PROTECTION (2006),
available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-
2012.pdf (granting player injured prior season who then fails next season's
preseason physical 50% of his salary for next season up to $275,000; operating
Disability Plan pursuant to art. LI).
38. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 364 (3d ed. 1996) (defining insurance). In-
surance is a contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify
another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising from the
occurrence of some specified contingency, and usually to defend the insured or to
pay for a defense regardless of whether the insured is ultimately found liable. See
id.
39. See id. at 364-67 (listing types of insurance).
40. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §1:2 (3d ed.
2009) (noting purpose of purchasing insurance for protection from risk).
41. There are of course some costs associated with purchasing and then col-
lecting on insurance coverage, known as premiums and deductibles.
42. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1219 (3d ed. 1996).
43. Id. at 444.
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of the theft, instead of losing $20,000, you have lost only $3,500.
On the other hand, if you did not purchase insurance and had not
been the victim of theft, you would have saved the $1,000 premium
cost. So the cost of the insurance, the likelihood of theft and peace
of mind are all factors for each individual making this type of
decision.
Disability insurance is insurance meant to "protect a person
from a loss of income during a period of incapacity for work. ''44
Disability insurance provides financial coverage for someone who is
unable, as a result of injury, to work at his or her job for an ex-
tended period of time.45 There are generally two types of disability
insurance policies: permanent and temporary disability. Perma-
nent disability insurance applies when the injury suffered prevents
the person from ever working again. Temporary disability policies
are applicable when the injury suffered prevents the person from
working for an extended period of time but he or she will be able to
return to work at some point. These terms will be discussed further
in Section III. Most of the disability insurance policies purchased
by athletes are for permanent disabilities, therefore these will be
the focus of this article. Temporary disability insurance will be
briefly discussed in Section V, Creative Options.
III. THE UNDERWRITING PROCESS
The underwriting process is the information collection and de-
cision making process undertaken by the insurer in making a deci-
sion whether to insure an individual, and if so, for how much and
how long. Underwriting is defined as "[t]he act of assuming a risk
by insuring it."46
In many types of insurance polices, the number of people buy-
ing the insurance is enough so that precise statistical measures can
be established to determine the premium amounts to be paid by
the insured party. 4 7 For example, a twenty-five year-old buying a
44. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 816 (8th ed. 2004) (defining disability
insurance).
45. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SECALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §182:2 (3d
ed. 2009) (stating what disability insurance entails). [Rule 15.4] Consequently,
disability insurance is not meant to provide coverage for someone who is out sick
for a week or even a month. See id.
46. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1528 (7th ed. 2004) (providing meaning of un-
derwriting) .
47. For information more on the proper pricing of insurance, see Steven Kass,
Life Insurance Fundamentals, 796 PLI/LIT 233 (2009); Justin Hurwitz, Indexing Health
Insurance to Marginal Health Status: A Spoonful of Economics Helps the Premiums Go
Down, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTHi CARE L. 43 (2009) T.13; Tom Baker, Containing the
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term life insurance policy might pay two-hundred sixty-five dollars
per year in premiums for a one million dollar policy. On the other
hand, a sixty-five year-old person may pay $4,800 for the same one
million dollar in coverage. 48 The insurance companies have statisti-
cal information, collected in actuarial tables, 49 indicating the likeli-
hood of collection on the policy for both a twenty-five year-old and
a sixty-five year-old. Furthermore, while the collection rate of
twenty-five year-olds might be 2% hypothetically, the premiums
paid by the other 98% of policy holders should more than cover the
payouts. Insurance companies are obviously for-profit enterprises,
and they consequently set premiums to reflect the statistical
realities.
As compared with life insurance, disability insurance policies
in sports generally do not have the wealth of statistical information
available from which to properly price policies. 50 Therefore, disa-
bility insurance in sports is considered a specialty area of insurance
that requires attentiveness to the market.51 In addition to the
wealth of data available on professional athletes, disability insur-
ance premiums in sports are based on experience (i.e. previously
collected premiums and payouts on policies) as best as possible, but
there can be tremendous variation in prices.52 The variations are
generally caused by two factors: a change in the number of claims
paid in a particular year or period and the amounts that may be
paid out in that period.
The underwriting process begins with an application by the
person seeking insurance. 53 Some of the basic information on the
Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371
(2002/2003).
48. See Tim Bain, QUICK QUOTE, Female vs. Male Term Life Insurance Premiums,
http://www.quickquote.com/cms/Blogs/Female vsMaleTermLifeInsur-
ancePremiums_197.html (Nov. 3, 2008) (providing insurance examples).
49. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1562 (8th ed. 2004) (stating an actuarial ta-
ble is an organized chart of statistical data indicating life expectancies for people
in various categories, such as age, family history, and chemical exposure).
50. Disability insurance provides financial coverage for any "loss of income
during a period of incapacity for work." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 816 (8th ed.
2004). There are generally two types of disability insurance policies, permanent
and temporary disability, both of which are discussed in further detail below. For a
further discussion of disability insurance, see infra notes 81-96 and accompanying
notes.
51. See Daniel A. Engel, The ADA and Lfe, Health, and Disability Insurance:
Where is the Liability?, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 227 (1997-98) (discussing state of disabil-
ity insurance).
52. See id. (discussing difficulty with valuation of disability insurance in
sports).
53. See, e.g., Florida Department of Financial Services- The Underwriting Pro-
cess, http://www.myfloridacfo.com/consumers/purchasinginsurance/underwrit-
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application helps the insurance company because it contains char-
acteristics, or risk factors, that determine the premium rates and
levels of insurability. 54 In the context of sports, the insurance rates
(premium costs per $1,000 of coverage) can vary depending on the
sport.55 The age of the individual is another important factor be-
cause there is a higher probability of a career-ending injury for an
older player than there is for a younger player.56 A twenty-two year
old pitcher is likely to be motivated to rehabilitate after "Tommy
John" surgery, while a forty-two year-old pitcher may not be. 57 An
athlete's position is also a factor that can cause changes in rates and
is required by the insurance application. 58 For example, the rates
for baseball pitchers will most likely be greater than the rates for
position players because of the stress on pitchers' arm due to the
amount of throwing required by the position.
Perhaps most importantly, the insurance application requests
that the athlete disclose any injury history.59 Rates will certainly
vary if there is a previous injury, which may re-occur or may lead to
other problems (i.e. a pitcher with previous elbow problems may be
more likely to develop rotator cuff injuries).60 The insurance com-
pany may also request medical records and/or require the player to
undergo a physical examination.61 Often insurance companies will
want to obtain a medical opinion on the athlete's health from their
own doctors or consultants. 62
ingprocess.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (describing underwriting process for
various types of insurance).
54. See id. (noting bases for insurance company's decision to insure).
55. See Serwin Rosen and Allen Sanderson, Labour Markets in Professional Sports,
THE ECONOMICJ. 111 (2001) (discussing premium rates in more detail).
56. See LEER. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §4:14 (3d ed.
2009) (stating what disability insurance entails).
57. See Mike Dodd, Tommy John surgery: Pitcher's best friend, USA TODAY, July 28,
2003, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2003-07-28-cover-tommy-
john.x.htm (reporting benefits Tommy John surgery has had on pitcher's ca-
reers). The surgery is named after the first pitcher to have had the surgery,
Tommy John surgery reconstructs the elbow's ulnar collateral ligament (the
"UCL"); the usual effect is greater pitching velocity. Prior to TommyJohn surgery,
an injured elbow ligament was usually "a pitcher's sentence to the broadcast booth
or the monthly autograph show at the local Holiday Inn." Id.
58. Krikor Meshefejian, Professional Sports Injuries: Is Your Team Insured?, U.
ILL. J. Bus. L. Soc'y (2005), available at http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illi-
noisbusiness law soc/2005/10/a-previous-arti.html.
59. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §4:4 (3d ed.
2009)
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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After the application and physical examination process is com-
plete, the insurance company has three options: (1) decline cover-
age, (2) provide insurance coverage but exclude a particular part of
the anatomy or charge a higher premium for a preexisting condi-
tion, or (3) provide insurance with no exclusions.63 If the insur-
ance company is willing to write an insurance policy, the next step
is to determine the amount of coverage.64 The amount of coverage
is considered the amount the insured has "at risk."'65 For example,
a college basketball student-athlete such as Wall will be considered
to have his first NBA (or European league) contract at risk.
The NBA CBA has a rookie wage scale in which rookie con-
tracts are slotted based on their draft position. 66 For instance, if
John Wall is drafted during the early part of the first round of the
NBA draft, he would be known as a "lottery pick and would likely
have a contract in the range of four to thirteen million dollars. 67
Furthermore, because he is most likely to receive this money on a
tax-free basis, Wall would have an insurable interest in the four mil-
lion to thirteen million dollars range.68 For a team that has insured
a guaranteed contract, for example the New York Yankees and
Mark Teixeira's $180 million contract, the insurable amount is the
full one hundred eighty million dollars. 69
In making decisions on the coverage amount, the insurer may
take into consideration the likely earnings of the athlete given the
63. See LFE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:6 (ex-
plaining option of insurance companies).
64. See id. (explaining the steps of insurance companies).
65. See 7 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §101:3 (3d
ed. 1995) (defining risk generally as "the category of loss the insurer agreed to
provide cover under the terms of the policy"). More specifically, the "risk" is the
amount the insurer agrees to cover narrowed by any specified exclusions. See id.
66. See NBA CBA art. VIII, § 1, available at http://www.nbpa.org/ cba/2005/
art.-viii-rookie-scale (setting forth "Rookie Scale Contracts for First Round Picks");
see also Hoopsworld.com, 2009-10 NBA Rookie Scale, http://www.hoops
world.com/Story.asp?story-id=9301 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (charting 2009-10
NBA Rookie Scale).
67. Id.
68. See 26 U.S.C. §104-05 (2000) (setting forth tax regulations for injury or
sickness compensation and amounts received under accident and health plans).
Payments from a disability insurance contract are not taxable if the recipient paid
the premiums on the contract. Id. If the employer paid the premiums, the insur-
ance payout is taxable income. Id. As a result, some teams will pay the player an
up-front bonus so that he will pay the premiums himself. Id. To account for the
player's tax-free benefit, insurance companies will often only agree to cover the
percentage of the contract the player would have received after-taxes. See 26
U.S.C. §1 (2006) (setting forth tax filing rules for individuals).
69. See Russ & SEGALIA, supra note 67, §101:3 (indicating that, unless subject
to other exclusions, amount at risk will be amount insurer agreed to cover).
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ability of the athlete, the team's potential and the conditions of the
CBA.70 Due to the NBA's wage scale, NFL rookies arguably receive
closer to their fair market value than do NBA rookies. 71 Conse-
quently, a college football player may have a greater insurable inter-
est than a college basketball player. As stated earlier, all of the Big
Four CBAs provide for varying levels of and opportunities for differ-
ent insurance policies.72 It is important for any party involved in an
insurance contract to be aware of these rights in case the player
needs to utilize them or to fill gaps in his or her coverage with other
insurance policies.
The insurance company must also make an assessment of abil-
ity and demand for the player. A player of marginal ability is less
likely to get opportunities to comeback from an injury, increasing
the likelihood that he or she would file a disability claim. 73 Further-
more, a star player may have tremendous future earnings potential,
but given the relatively high risk involved in sports, an insurance
company may decide that the player has more at risk than the com-
pany is willing to insure.74
Another additional factor in the underwriting process is the
character of the insured. 75 In recent years, the Big Four leagues
have adopted or strengthened their personal conduct policies and,
most notably in the NFL, several well-known players, such as
Michael Vick and Adam "Pacman" Jones, have received lengthy sus-
pensions for illegal or inappropriate off-the-field activities. 76 Fur-
70. See IA LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §17:2 (3d
ed. 1995) (discussing importance that insurance contract should fit both parties'
needs). So long as there is no conflict with provision of law or public policy, the
insurer (like the insured) can consider and contract for any specifics that are in its
best interest. See id. (reiterating what is taken into consideration when
contracting).
71. See NBA CBA art. VIII, supra note 66, § 1 (setting forth NBA wage scale).
72. For a further discussion of the Big Four CBA's opportunities for insurance
policies, see supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
73. See7 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §101:2 (3d
ed. 1995) (noting that parties can contract for which risks insurers will or will not
insure). Insurers are free to determine which risks they will not cover. See id.
74. See id. (indicating that policies do not cover risks that are substantially
probable).
75. See id. ("Policies provide coverage for various risks, which differ from pol-
icy to policy. Except for the risk requirements previously discussed and barring
public policy considerations, the parties are free to contract for which risks the
insurer shall or shall not insure.").
76. See Mike Florio, NFL's Conduct Policy Coming Up Short So Far, SPORT-
INGNEws.coM, June 23, 2008, http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/art./2008-06-23/
nfls-conduct-policy-coming-short-so-far (stating that NFL enacted new personal
conduct policy in April of 2007); NFL Personal Conduct Policy, ESPN, Mar. 13, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2798214 (laying out new policy).
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thermore, athletes of questionable character may be less likely to be
given a comeback opportunity, and thus, may not put in the neces-
sary hard work to successfully rehabilitate a previous injury.
IV. THE INSURANCE POLICY
A. The Amount
The amount of the insurance policy constitutes the total sum
of money that the insurance company has agreed to provide to the
insured in the case of a valid claim. 7 7 Once the coverage amount is
determined or agreed upon, the premiums and deductible
amounts are established. 78 Assuming that insured individuals pay
the premium amounts themselves, they will receive payouts as a tax-
free lump sum. 79 Net present value is generally not a consideration
in insurance contracts. 80
B. The Definition of Career-Ending
One of the most contentious issues in an athlete disability in-
surance contract is whether the athlete has suffered the type of in-
jury contemplated by the contract and worthy of a payout. Most
athlete disability insurance contracts are meant to provide insur-
ance for a career-ending injury, hence one that prevents the player
Michael Vick was suspended after his conviction for allowing a dog-fighting ring to
be run out of his Virginia home. See NFL Suspends Vick Indefinitely, CNN.coM, Aug.
24, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/08/24/michael.vick/index.html
(reporting Michael Vick's suspension). Adam "Pacman" Jones was indefinitely sus-
pended in the summer of 2008 after a serious of off-field personal conduct viola-
tions. See Sam Farmer, "Pacman "Jones Gets Indefinite Suspension, L.A.TIMES.COM, Oct.
15, 2008, http://art.s.latimes.com/2008/oct/15/sports/sp-nflrepl5 (reporting
Jones suspension).
77. See 12 LEE R. Russ & THoMAs F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §182:16
(3d ed. 1995) (documenting that recoverable amounts are contracted for by the
parties). "If an insurer wishes to limit its liability for disability benefits to a certain
period of time, or a specific amount of money, it must clearly state its intention to
do so in the policy. Where clearly stated, such a limitation will be enforced accord-
ing to its terms." Id.
78. See 5 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SECALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §69:1 (3d
ed. 1995) (defining premium as "consideration paid an insurer for undertaking to
indemnify the insured against a specified peril"). The premium amount is deter-
mined based on the risk assumed. See id. (clarifying method of establishing proper
premium). The amount of a covered loss the insurer ultimately owes the insured
is adjusted by any agreed upon additions or deductions. See 11 LEE R. Russ &
THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §168:1 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining how
much insured will be paid adjusted by certain things contained in policy, such as
deductible).
79. See 26 U.S.C. §104-05 (2000) (exempting disability insurance payments
from taxable income if recipient, rather than employer, pays premiums).
80. See Russ, supra note 67 (explaining insurance valuation generally).
2010]
15
Wong and Deubert: The Legal & Business Aspects of Career-Ending Disability Insuranc
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
488 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
from ever being able to play again. The issue gets controversial
when it is difficult to ascertain whether the end of an athlete's ca-
reer is a result of an injury or the player's skill level resulted in the
end of his or her career.
Most of the contracts contain language requiring the athlete to
suffer a "permanent total disability" or some variation thereof.81
Permanent total disability typically requires that the athlete be com-
pletely unable to perform their profession or sport for an entire
twelve-month period after the initial injury.82 Typically, players can
only buy permanent total disability policies while teams are able to
buy temporary disability policies to protect their guaranteed con-
tract obligations (discussed in more detail in Section V.A. Tempo-
rary Disability Policies). 83 In order to qualify for the permanent
total disability benefit, policies generally will usually require that
there be a medical determination that the disability will terminate
the athlete's participation in his or her sport.84
Additionally, some contracts require that the athlete make best
efforts to rehabilitate the injury.85 In the absence of such a require-
ment, the insurer will use provisions to encourage a player to re-
turn. For example, many contracts allow the player to resume
playing for a specified period of time without jeopardizing resump-
tion of future insurance benefits if the comeback effort is unsuc-
cessful. 86 In a permanent total disability policy such a provision is
81. See Interviews with Barry Aframe, Senior Vice President of Legal Affairs,
and William F. Hubbard, Chairman, of HCC Specialty Underwriters, A Subsidiary
of HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc., the leading underwriter of sports insurance con-
tracts. (on file with author) [Hereinafter HCC Specialty Underwriters]; see also Ex-
ceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, NCAA.oRG, http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCMGLOBALCONTEXT=/wps/wcm/con-
nect/ncaa/NCAA/About+The+NCAA/Budget+and+Finances/Insurance/excep-
tional.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) (explaining that ESDI program offers
permanent total disability plan). [
82. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 83 (indicating that permanent
total disability policies pay lumps sums after expiration of twelve month elimina-
tion period).
83. See Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, NCAA.oRG,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM GLOBALCONTEXT=/wps/
wcm/connect/ncaa/NCAA/About+The+NCAA/Budget+and+Finances/Insur-
ance/exceptional.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) ("To be eligible for benefits, it
must be medically determined, at the end of the elimination period and before
the benefit is paid, that the insured student-athlete will never be able to participate
in his or her sporting activity, at the professional level.").
84. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
85. See id.
86. See id.
[Vol. 17: p. 473
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/8
DISABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES IN SPORTS
known as the "rehabilitation benefit" and in a temporary disability
policy it is called the "recurrent disability provision."8 7
Issues often arise when a player attempts to rehabilitate the in-
jury and at any time holds himself out as being completely
healthy.88 Once an athlete's contract expires, the athlete's previous
team is only liable to continue paying the athlete during the typical
time it takes for the athlete to recover from the injury, but if the
contract is guaranteed the athlete will continue to be paid regard-
less.89 If the team does not wish to keep the injured player on its
roster it will often negotiate some sort of an injury settlement with
the player.90
Health is an essential element for an unemployed team athlete
to receive a new job. All contracts in the Big Four require that the
athlete to agree that he is healthy and in excellent condition. 91
Consequently, any athlete who may potentially be eligible for a disa-
bility insurance claim must consider whether they have fully recov-
ered from the injury and whether or not the earnings he may
receive with a new team will exceed the potential insurance payout.
Nevertheless, the insured athlete has the burden of proof to estab-
lish that he is disabled and entitled to benefits. 92 Once an athlete
establishes that he is disabled and is not playing, it would be the
insurer's responsibility to establish that the athlete has the ability to
recover if the insurer chooses to contest the payment of benefits.93
Ultimately, disability must be a fact question, not a player choice. In
this situation, the insurers have an advantage because athletes are
87. See id.
88. See 12 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §182:23
(3d ed. 1995) (pointing out that some policies may provide rehabilitation
benefits).
89. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
90. See id.
91. See NFL CBA, supra note 8, at Appendix C: NFL Player Contract, Para-
graph 8, available at http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/CBA-Download/ (re-
quiring that players represent that they are physically fit and will maintain that
fitness); NBA CBA, Exhibit A: NBA Uniform Player Contract, Paragraph 7, availa-
ble at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005/exhibit-national-basketball-association-uni-
form-player-contract (demanding players to report in good physical condition and
maintain that condition through each NBA season); MLB CBA, Schedule A: Uni-
form Player's Contract, Condition, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/
cba.jsp (expecting players to represent that they have no known physical or mental
defects that would prevent or impair their performance); NHL CBA, Exhibit 1,
Standard Player's Contract, Paragraphs 2 and 6, available at http://www.nhlpa.
com/About-Us/CBA/ (ordering that players report and remain in good physical
condition).
92. For discussion of athlete's need to prove disability see infra notes 284-308
and accompanying text.
93. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
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typically highly motivated people who will make every effort to con-
tinue playing.
It is not uncommon for an athlete to attest that he is healthy in
contract as requested by the team and then either have recurring
troubles with the injury or not play well enough to stay on the
team.94 In these instances, the athlete has risked chance to claim
permanent total disability.95 Nevertheless, the rehabilitation bene-
fit provision for permanent total disability policies (and the recur-
rent disability provision in temporary total disability policies) does,
however, give the player the opportunity to test out his playing abil-
ity without risking entitlement to further benefits. 96
C. The Waiting Period
Under an athlete disability insurance policy, the athlete cannot
collect the insurance payout immediately following suffering a po-
tentially career-ending injury. As part of the insurance contract, the
athlete must establish permanent total disability, which requires the
athlete be unable to perform at his sport for twelve months follow-
ing the injury. The waiting period helps determine whether the
injury suffered is temporary or legitimately career ending as con-
templated by the policy. There are particularly rare and controver-
sial situations where an athlete may be unable to perform for twelve
months, collects on his insurance policy but then attempts later a
comeback.97 The permanent disability benefits are generally condi-
tional on the fact that the athlete can no longer perform. Thus, if
the athlete returns to play, the payment terms of the disability bene-
fits usually mandate that the athlete return the insurance benefits
before he or she is able to become an active member of an athletic
program. 98
D. Exclusions
It is rare for an athlete to reach an elite or professional status
without having suffered an injury and many have suffered major
94. See id.
95. See Boston Mut. Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Islanders Hockey Club, L.P., 165 F.3d 93,
93-94 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that misrepresentations made on players' insurance
applications entitled insurers to rescission).
96. See 12 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGAL[A, COUCH ON INSURANCE §182:23
(3d ed. 1995) (indicating that clearly stated rehabilitation benefit provisions will
benefit insured by offering option for rehabilitation).
97. For further discussion on returning after a career-ending injury, see infra
notes 294-305 and accompanying test.
98. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
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injuries. Consequently, teams and insurance companies are often
hesitant to employ or insure an athlete that is more likely to suffer a
serious injury.99 It is not uncommon for teams to require a player
to execute an injury waiver, which describes a specific preexisting
medical condition of the player. 100 Should the player suffer the
same or a substantially related injury the team is not required to
fulfill its obligations under the contract, i.e. the team can cut the
athlete without compensation. 10 1
Insurance companies execute very similar exclusion clauses in
their athlete disability insurance contracts. 102 As part of the appli-
cation process an athlete must submit a detailed medical history
and may even have to undergo a physical examination by the insur-
ance company's own doctor. 10 3 Failure to complete these forms ac-
curately and honestly may nullify the insurance agreement. 10 4 If a
player has a preexisting medical condition, the insurance contract
may state that the athlete cannot recover under the disability insur-
ance policy for an injury related to the preexisting condition or the
policy may exclude all coverage to that area of that anatomy. 10 5
The relatively high risk of injury in sports is what makes it essential
that the insurance company receive truthful and accurate informa-
tion from the athlete-applicant. 10 6
99. SeeJohn C. Williams, J.D., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provi-
sion in Health or Hospitalization Policy Excluding or Postponing Coverage of Illness
Originating Prior to Issuance of Policy or Within Stated Time, 94 A.L.R.3d 990 (1975)
(majority rule is that illness must manifest itself or result in symptoms capable of
diagnosis by doctor before policy is issued in order to qualify as pre-existing condi-
tion); see also HC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 83.
100. See NBA CBA, Exhibit A, NBA Uniform Player Contract, Exhibit 3, Prior
Injury Exclusion, http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%20A.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (presenting NBA form for waiver of compensation in
event of injury related to prior injury.).
101. See id. ("The Player's right to receive his Compensation as set forth in
paragraphs 7(c), 16(a) (iii), 16(b) of this Contract, or otherwise is limited or elimi-
nated with respect to the following reinjuring the injury or aggravation of the con-
dition set forth below...").
102. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
103. See id.
104. See Boston Mut. Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Islanders Hockey Club, L.P., 165 F.3d 93
(1st Cir. 1999) (noting that fraudulent statements on professional hockey player
insurance application renders contract void).
105. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
106. See Professional Athlete High Limit Disability Insurance- American
Health Administrators, http://www.aha-ins.com/proathdisability.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2010) (noting exclusion of coverage for known and unknown pre-existing
athlete injuries).
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E. Type of Coverage and Term of Coverage
The insurance contract is very specific in that it will only cover
injuries incurred during or related to the athlete's professional ca-
reer. 10 7 Concussions and illnesses are also generally covered unless
specifically excluded. All contracts in the Big Four require that the
athlete withhold from participating in other activities that involve a
significant risk of injury, including sports in which the athlete is not
a professional. 10 8 If an athlete is injured participating in a different
sport without the permission of his team, he risks having his con-
tract voided.10 9
Contracts in MLB and the NBA are guaranteed for injuries that
occur off the field and off-the-court, so long as the player has not
violated the hazardous activities clause of his standard player con-
tract.1 0 In the NHL, contracts are only guaranteed for injuries that
occur during hockey-related activities."' 1 As a result, many NHL
players buy insurance for off-ice injuries that covers them to the
extent that MLB and NBA players are covered.11 2 Regardless, an
athlete's disability insurance contract does not normally provide
coverage if he violates the hazardous activities clause of his standard
player contract.113 Nevertheless, some athletes do buy insurance
that protects them and their contracts if they are injured during a
barred hazardous activity. 114
107. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
108. See NFL CBA, Appendix C NFL Player Contract, Paragraph 3, available at
http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/34732966#/34732966/1 (last visited Feb.
26, 2010) (requiring that NFL players not engage in activities involving significant
risk of personal injury); NBA CBA supra note 103 (prohibiting NBA players from
engaging in activities that present risk of personal injury); MLB CBA, Schedule A
Uniform Player's Contract, Other Sports, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/
pa/pdf/cbaenglish.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (ordering that MLB players
refrain from non-baseball activities presenting significant risk of personal injury);
NHL CBA, Exhibit 1, Standard Player's Contract, Paragraph 7, available at http://
www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (mandating that NHL
players refrain from non-hockey related activities presenting risk of personal in-
jury). ).
109. See Aaron Portzline, Off-Field Fun for Athletes Can Be Risky Business, Colum-
bus Dis, May 4, 2005, at S01E. The New York Yankees voided third-baseman Aaron
Boone's contract before the 2005 season after Boone suffered a severe knee injury
playing pick-up basketball. Boone had months earlier hit a dramatic game-winning
home run in Game 7 of the ALCS to carry the Yankees over the Boston Red Sox.
See id. Boone's departure cleared the way for the Yankees to acquire Alex Rodri-
guez. See id.
110. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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The term of the contract is simply the number of years or sea-
sons for which the insurance company agrees to provide coverage
to the athlete. 115 The term is an essential component of the cover-
age, premium and deductible calculations. Many athlete disability
insurance contracts reserve the insurer's right to discontinue cover-
age in the event that the athlete is traded. 11 6 This provision gives
the insurer the opportunity to reevaluate the risk, in light of possi-
ble changes in risk due to such things as changing role, different
playing surface, different risk management or training strategies.' 17
F. Death
An athlete may choose to purchase a life insurance policy, how-
ever, such a policy is generally separate and unrelated to an athlete
disability insurance policy. A life insurance policy covers a much
broader spectrum of events upon which collection can be based. 118
A life insurance policy is paid to its designated beneficiaries upon
the death of the insured, but the death certainly need not be re-
lated to the athlete's participation in an athletic event. Typically
disability benefits cannot be collected after death of the insured.1 19
Nevertheless, teams can insure against the sudden loss of a player,
even upon accidental death.120
V. CREATIVE OPTIONS
A. Temporary Disability Policies
A disability is temporary if it "exists until an injured worker is as
far restored as the nature of the injury will permit.' 2 1 A temporary
disability policy allows the insured to recover during the time in
which the insured or the subject of the insurance is unable to work.
In the sports context, this is a policy, which is typically only used by
a team and not the player.' 2 2 The goal or purpose of a team
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). See also Alaska Indust. Bd. v.
Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 356 U.S. 320 (1958) (delineating employee's permanent disa-
bility from temporary disability for insurance coverage purposes); Air Am., Inc. v.
Director, Officer of Workers' Compensation Programs, 597 F.2d 773 (1st Cir.
1979) (upholding award for partial temporary disability and excluding and defin-
ing permanent disability and total temporary disability).
122. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
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purchasing a temporary disability policy is to provide protection in
a situation where a player suffers a serious, but less than career-
ending injury.
Considering that most contracts are guaranteed in professional
sports, teams are still obligated to pay injured players. Conse-
quently teams may take out insurance on some of their higher
priced players, such that if that player is unable to play, at least the
team does not have to pay all of his salary. For example, if Yankees
pitcher and recipient of a seven-year, one hundred sixty one mil-
lion dollar contract CC Sabathia injured his arm and required
"Tommy John" surgery, he may not be able to pitch for a year or
two. 123 While the Yankees would not be able to collect on a perma-
nent disability insurance policy, they could collect under a tempo-
rary disability policy. 124
MLB does not have a league-wide disability insurance program.
Consequently, teams contract individually on certain player con-
tracts, typically up to a maximum of three years at a time.125 Typi-
cally temporary disability insurance contracts in MLB contain a
sixty-day, ninety-day or full-season waiting policy.' 26 The range in
premium amounts accounts for the player's position and age: the
cost for a 25 year-old shortstop would be less than that of a thirty
two year-old pitcher. 127 The ninety-day policy is the most common
policy. It is believed that the NBA's required waiting period is forty-
one games or half a season and that the NHL requires a thirty game
waiting period.128
B. "Key-Man" Insurance Policies
"Key-man" insurance is a relatively new insurance arrangement
that provides benefits to probable playoff teams that do not make
the playoffs as a result of an injury to a star player, or "key-man."'129
123. See Kat O'Brien, Yankees: Expectations a mound high, NEWSDAY (New York),
Dec. 19, 2008, at A94 (noting potential results of Sabathia hypothetical injury
under contract).
124. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Zurich Financial Services Australia, Key Person Insurance- Who
Needs It?, http://www.zurich.com.au/zportal/cs/ContentServer?pagename=Bro-
kers/Page/ThreeColumnLeadImage&cid=1 242903898768&p=1242903898006
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (explaining purpose and importance of key person in-
surance as applied to businesses and highlighting professional sports teams as ex-
amples of such). Outside of the sporting world, "key man" insurance is used to
protect businesses from loss of revenue due to the illness, incapacitation, or death
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Based on team expectations, in the preseason, an insurance com-
pany will offer to reimburse the amount of a typical postseason
game's revenues if an agreed upon star player misses a certain num-
ber of games during that season.1 30
For example, in 2008, the New England Patriots was consid-
ered a prime candidate to make the postseason since the team had
made the playoffs from 2003 until 2007, including Super Bowl ap-
pearances in 2003, 2004 and 2007. An injury to star quarterback,
Tom Brady, in the first game of the season left Brady unavailable
for the remainder of the season.131 Perhaps in part because of
Brady's absence, the Patriots failed to make the playoffs. If the Pa-
triots had "key-man" insurance, they could have recovered an
amount equal to the projected revenues from that missed playoff
game.13 2 Some teams may base their policies on the health of sev-
eral key players. For example, the 2009 Philadelphia Eagles might
have had a policy based on the health of quarterback Donovan Mc-
Nabb and running back Brian Westbrook - both of relatively equal
value to the team's success. 13
3
C. Loss of Value Insurance
One increasingly popular option for athletes approaching free
agency, particularly NFL players, is "loss of value" insurance. In
general, "loss of value" policies allow a player to recoup money the
player would have made as a free agent absent an injury.134 In gen-
eral, insurance companies are reluctant to provide coverage on
these types of policies. A "loss of value" policy may work in differ-
ent ways, in the first example, the policy requires a player to miss a
certain amount of games but includes a threshold amount of value
lost based on the player's most recent contract offer.1 35 For exam-
ple, a player that is a season away from free agency and is offered a
fifty million dollar contract by his existing team and misses at least
four games in the final season of his existing contract can recover
of an individual whose special talents or expertise provide the business with an
economic advantage. See Id. ("Key person insurance is designed to protect the
business should it lose someone who makes such a significant contribution towards
the company's profitability, stability and growth potential").
130. HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
131. See id.
132. See id. Teams might also use insurance policies that allow them to re-
cover for future lost playoff game revenues resulting from losing a playoff game at
home. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81
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the policy amount only if his most recent contract offer is less than
twenty five million dollars. If he receives an offer over twenty mil-
lion dollar, he cannot recover 1 36
In the second type of "loss of value", a maximum benefit
amount is agreed to and if the player receives an offer for less than
that amount and the reason for the reduction is because of sickness
or injury the insurance company agrees to pay the difference be-
tween the highest offer and the maximum benefit amount. For ex-
ample, if the maximum benefit is ten million dollars and the player
suffers an injury that causes him to receive an offer of only eight
million dollars the insurance company will pay the difference of
two million dollars. If, however, during the life of that eight million
dollar contract the player eventually receives more than the eight
million dollars he must return the benefits up to the two million
dollars he recovered.13 7
While the threshold amount has deterred some players from
using the expensive policies because premiums can cost well over
$100,000, "loss of value" insurance can prove a useful tool to a
player and agent who feel that a player is not being offered his fair
market value. One player known to have purchased such a policy is
Dallas Cowboys quarterback Tony Romo, who purchased a thirty
million dollar policy prior to the 2007 season, during which he
eventually signed a six-year, $67.5 million contract extension. 38
D. "Loss of Draft" Position
A loss of draft position policy covers professional prospects
who are not drafted as highly as expected and the loss of income
associated with that drop in draft status. Such policies, though most
common in the NFL, have recently become less prevalent given the
general financial situation in the United States and uncertainty over
how an impending NFL CBA might alter rookie wages. 139
Insurance companies offer contingent personal accident poli-
cies meant to protect a player's anticipated draft position and con-
sequent compensation. 140 The policy does not require that the
player miss a particular number of games, but instead requires that
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Even if he drops ball, Romo cashes in, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2007 at C2
(calling Romo a "forward thinker" for purchasing "loss of value" insurance ena-
bling him to collect insurance payments for non career-ending injuries),
139. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
140. See id.
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for coverage to apply, the injury must be serious and lasting. 141 In
order to be serious the injury must negatively affect the player's
skills in a manner that causes substantial and material deterioration
in his or her ability to perform; the illness must negatively affect his
or her skills permanently. 1 42
The player's anticipated compensation is determined from by
his expected draft position, with a maximum limit of liability (gen-
erally half of the anticipated compensation) .143 For example, if the
player anticipated to be drafted at position garnering a twelve mil-
lion dollar contract, the maximum limit of liability for the insur-
ance coverage would be six million dollar. If the player ultimately
only receives a three million dollar contract because of a covered
injury or illness, insurance would only provide six million dollar of
the nine million dollar difference between his expected and actual
contracts.
The insurance contract requires that if benefits are paid and
the player ends up earning an amount that, combined with the ben-
efits paid exceeds the anticipated compensation within a specified
number of years, the player must return the excess amount of bene-
fits he received. 144 Consequently, using the above example, if the
player eventually earns eight million dollars in compensation dur-
ing the first six years of his career, combined with the six million
dollars insurance benefit, he has now received fourteen million dol-
lars. As a result, he would be required to return two million dollars
of the insurance benefit.
E. Reducing Exposure
As mentioned earlier, athlete disability insurance is a specialty
item with a relatively high level of risk considering the uncertainty
of statistical information and the comparatively low number of poli-
cyholders. To combat risk, insurance companies often "reinsure"
the policies they underwrite. Reinsurance is the "[i] nsurance of all
or part of one insurer's risk by a second insurer, who accepts the
risk in exchange for a percentage of the original premium."1 45 Ef-
fectively, the original insurance company sells a part of the insur-
ance contract to another insurance company. Reinsurance serves
three main purposes for the insurance company:
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. BLACK's LAw DICIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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First, reinsurance can increase the capacity of the insurer
to accept risk. The insurer may be enabled to take on
larger individual risks, or a large number of smaller risks,
or a combination of both .... Secondly, reinsurance can
promote financial stability by ameliorating the adverse
consequences of an unexpected accumulation of losses or
of single catastrophic losses, because these will, at least in
part, be absorbed by reinsurers. Thirdly, reinsurance can
strengthen the solvency of an insurer from the point of
view of any regulations under which the insurer must op-
erate which provide for a minimum 'solvency margin,'
generally expressed as a ratio of net premium income over
capital and free reserves. 146
Taking the example from earlier, if Kentucky's John Wall is
insured for four million dollars, his policy may be broken up and
sold off to several insurance companies. This reduces the risk for
the company that writes the original policy and spreads the risk and
return for the insurance companies.
The practice of reinsurance began in the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth centuries as a way of protecting companies from the expen-
sive and risky adventures involved in the marine shipping
industry.147 The practice was proliferated with the establishment of
Lloyd's of London in 1710.148 The same concepts apply today,
some things do not happen very often, but when they do, the loss
can be very large. Therefore, it is wise to spread the risk among
companies by reinsurance.
146. See P.T. O'NEILL & J.W. WOLONIECKI, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE IN EN-
GLAND AND BERMUDA 4 (1998). See also EDWIN W. KOPF, NOTES ON ORIGIN AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF REINSURANCE 25 (1929). (describing purposes of reinsurance). The
practice of reinsurance began in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries as a way
to protect companies from the expensive and risky adventures involved in the
marine shipping industry. See id. The practice was proliferated with the establish-
ment of Lloyd's of London in 1710. See id. The same concepts apply today, some
things do not happen very often, but when they do, the loss can be very large. See
id at 25-27.
147. See Edwin W. Kopf, NoTEs ON ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF REINSURANCE
(Globe Printing Company, Inc. 1929) (offering early history regarding reinsurance
industry).
148. See id. (noting economical growth of reinsurance industry).
[Vol. 17: p. 473
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/8
DISABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES IN SPORTS
VI. THE BUSINESS SIDE- PERSPECTIVES
A. Brokers
In general, a "broker" is someone who represents persons seek-
ing insurance, as opposed to an "agent" who represents the entities
that sell insurance. 149 In most statutes, brokers are referred to as
"insurance producers. 150 Brokers must be licensed and can sell,
solicit or negotiate insurance. 151 Generally brokers are compen-
sated either through fee arrangements or commissions on the in-
surance premiums.152 There is generally no fiduciary duty for a
broker towards their customer; they are "to exercise reasonable skill
and ordinary diligence. 1 53
The brokers' interest in the use of disability insurance policies
in sports is simply an enlarged insurance market and more employ-
ment opportunities. As the financial stakes increase for players and
teams, more insurance policies are likely and insurance brokers
stand to reap the rewards. Although the market for premiums is
comparatively unstable in the insurance field, brokers can still stand
to make sizable profits off insurance policies that routinely have
premiums in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. In general, it is
good practice for insurance brokers to be careful not to try and
oversell unnecessary policies, or face potential liability. 154
B. Insurance Companies
With properly calculated risk, insurance companies should not
only be willing, but be actively looking to insure almost anything.
The fundamental principle of insurance is that even if the under-
149. See Richard E. Quinby, Insurance Brokers, Agents and Advisors, in MASSA-
CHUSETTS LIABILITY INSURANCE MANUAL 10 (2009) (defining broker and agent).
150. See id. (explaining statutory status of brokers).
151. See id. at §10.2 (defining broker as one who is licensed to sell, solicit or
negotiate insurance).
152. See Priya Cherian Huskins & Clark Morton, Choosing Your Insurance Broker,
in 796 P.AC. LAw INST. LITic. & ADMIN. HANDBOOK SERIES 501, 505-06 (2009)
(describing traditional methods for compensating brokers as either commissions
on insurance premiums or contingent fee arrangements).
153. See Quinby, supra note 151, at §10.4.1 (citing Hartford Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. United Truck Leasing Corp., 511 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987), review denied, 513 N.E.2d 1289 (1987)) (outlining broker's duty).
154. See Johnson v. Amerus Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3826774, 1-4 (S.D.Fla.
2006) (entertaining case where broker allegedly took advantage of professional
football player). In 2005, Andre Johnson, a Pro Bowl wide receiver with the Hous-
ton Texans, filed suit against Rodney Brown and Amerus Life Insurance, contend-
ing that they took advantage of him when he was 22 years old and convinced him
to purchase over $43 million in life insurance with annual premiums of $375,000.
See id. The case was eventually settled out of court. See id.
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writer has to pay out on a few claims, the policies and premiums
where a claim is not made will more than make up for the financial
loss of the claims. Consequently, athlete disability insurance poli-
cies are just another extension of the constantly growing insurance
field. 155
One major issue, with which insurance companies have had to
deal with, is properly pricing the insurance premiums on athlete
disability policies. 156 As salary inflation and the rates of injury in
professional sports have been difficult things to predict, insurance
premiums have had trouble adjusting appropriately. 157 The events
of September l1th had a dramatic impact on the entire insurance
industry.158 In 2002, the premium on a MLB outfielder was about
seven dollars and twenty-seven cents per $1,000 insured and twenty-
four dollars and twenty-five cents per $1,000 insured for a pitcher,
about twenty percent more than in previous years. 159 At the same
time, an NHL player paid about six dollars and fifty cents for every
$1,000 insured. 160
As competitive pressures have pushed salaries higher and
made contracts longer, insurance companies have been less willing
to assume the risks. Coverage amounts dipped as low as fifty to sev-
enty percent of contracts in 2004 as opposed to eighty percent ear-
lier years. 161 In addition, insurance companies are less willing to
insure long-term contracts, often drawing the line at three years. 162
Although the market has proved difficult to ascertain, there
are still billions of dollars of contracts capable of being insured.
Over time, as insurance companies develop a better understanding
155. See Nando Di Fino, Fantasy Football Insurance: A New Kind of Pocket Protec-
tion Against NFL Injuries, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009 (reporting that disability insur-
ance policies have even extended to fantasy sports leagues and owners).
156. See Michael Loney, Playing Hardball, in 22 REACTIONS 8 (2002) (noting
how recently insurance rates for players is increasing as players' skill value continu-
ously increase).
157. See id. (discussing adjustments of insurance premiums in multiple
sports).
158. See id. ("'The market was changing before September 11,' says Idelson at
ASU. 'But September 11 really accelerated that. Now there are less insurers
available.'").
159. See id. (noting examples of premium rates for MLB players).
160. See Steve Caulk, Olympians Find Insurance Costly, Athletes Safeguard Finan-
cial Future Against Career-Ending Injuries, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Feb. 2,
2002, at 8S (listing cost for average twenty-two-year-old hockey player in NHL).
161. See Gordon Edes, Club Policy Has Shifted On Insurance Policy Shift On Insur-
ance C, Boston Globe, May 5, 2004, at El (relaying drop in available insurance
coverage for pitchers).
162. See id. (mentioning limits to insurance coverage that companies are will-
ing to afford).
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of the market and can develop more fluid pricing models, under-
writing disability insurance policies for athletes and teams should
be a profitable enterprise. 163 Considering that benefit amounts are
quite large and the risk of injury substantial, in order to be profita-
ble, insurance companies must obtain all of the relevant informa-
tion available on the applicant and underwrite the risk carefully.1 64
Like many of the companies that do business with a sports organiza-
tion, insurance companies may be more likely to get involved with
the sports industry for the fringe benefits and the association with
that sports organization or athlete. Nonetheless, the risk for an in-
surance company is much more than that of a sponsor or business
partner. Although the sports industry may not be as large as other
industrial sectors, it still generates billions of dollars. As a result,
insurance companies actively participate in representing a sports
organization or player's insurance needs including professional and
malpractice, facilities, or events. 165
Two of the most important organizations involved in the sports
insurance business are Lloyd's of London ("Lloyd's") and HCC In-
surance Holdings, Inc ("HCC").166 Lloyd's is not an insurance
company but instead a specialist insurance market consisting of a
complex web of insurance companies, agents and brokers. 167 Over
one thousand member insurance companies operate in syndicates
or groups, covering many specialty areas of insurance. 168 The com-
panies conduct business through specialist managing agents, which
are companies specifically established for the purpose of managing
the syndicate.1 69 The agents, through the syndicates, then deal with
Lloyd's member brokers, who represent potential clients.170
A syndicate with expertise in the area will sign on as the lead
and take a portion of the risk. Other syndicates will then follow and
163. See What is Lloyd's?, http://www.lloyds.com/About_.Us/What is Lloyds/,
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009); see also Lloyd's Market, http://www.lloyds.com/
lloyds-market/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (introducing Lloyd's and their insur-
ance market).
164. See What is Lloyd's?, supra note 165. (describing what Lloyd's operation of
business).
165. See id. (articulating agent/client relationship at Lloyd's).
166. See id. (outlining syndicate expertise and management of risk by syndi-
cate underwriting).
167. See id ("Lloyd's is not an insurance company, it is a partially mutual mar-
ket where members of Lloyds join together as syndicates to insure risks.")
168. See id (depicting graph listing unique classes covered by Lloyds).
169. See id. ("The Lloyd's market is made up of 51 managing agents running
80 syndicates.").
170. See id. (describing how Lloyd's brokers "shop around" within syndicates
to find best policies and coverage for clients ).
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subscribe to the risk until it is fully underwritten. 171 For example
the lead may take a fifteen percent share and four following syndi-
cates may each take ten percent and nine other following syndicates
may each take five percent; this way there is a broad sharing of the
risk. This risk sharing system enables Lloyd's to have the advantage
of being able to write large and volatile risks through its built in risk
sharing system. Individual insurers based in the United States can
achieve similar risk sharing by obtaining reinsurance for the cover-
age from a number of reinsurers.172
HCC is a specialty insurance group with offices in several coun-
tries. 173 HCC's business strategy involves writing insurance in "se-
lected, narrowly defined specialty lines of businesses where
underwriting profits can be achieved. ' 174 Among the areas of insur-
ance in HCC's Sports, Entertainment and Executives line of busi-
ness are temporary and permanent total disability, contractual
bonus, image protection, and team stop-loss. 17 5 The temporary and
permanent disability policies are for individual athletes while the
team stop-loss policies are for teams.1 76 A team stop-loss policy pro-
vides insurance coverage to teams based on the number and type of
injuries to its roster.177 HCC personnel have been underwriting
sports insurance risks in the United States for over thirty years and
have been pioneers in the development of policy language, prod-
ucts and rate structures unique to the sports disability business.
C. Agents
Athlete-agents or player representatives have a fiduciary duty to
act in the best interests of their clients and other players in the
league at all times. 178 Consequently, in a situation where an athlete
171. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
172. For further discussion on this topic see supra notes 143-46 and accompa-
nying text.
173. See About HCC, http://www.hcc.com/about.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2010) (outlining HCC and its origins).
174. See Lines of Business, Sports Entertainment and Executives, http://
www.hcc.com/lines-of business.php?category=29 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (list-
ing areas of HCC's business).
175. See Team Stop Loss, http://www.hccsu.com/products/sports/team-
stop.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (describing essence of Team Stop-Loss and
availability).
176. See id. (explaining Team Stop Loss coverage is appropriate when total
amount of claims exceeds team's pre-specified amount).
177. See id. (noting coverage for what team stop-loss is available).
178. See NFPLA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors (as amended
through March 2007) §3.A(17) , available at http://images.nflplayers.com/media
Resources/files/PDFs/SCAA/NFLPARegulations-ContractAdvisors.pdf [herein-
after NFLPA Agent Regs] (describing duty of agent in NFL); NHLPA Regulations
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has an injury history, impending free agency , a non-guaranteed
contract, or other situation which might make his future cash flows
reasonably uncertain, it may make sense for that athlete to obtain
insurance on those future cash flows, notably his contract with the
team.
One of the cardinal rules of player representation is that the
agent cannot charge or collect a commission of any kind until the
player receives his compensation upon which that fee is based, ex-
cept for tax purposes. 1 79 Only two of the Big Four players associa-
tions (the NFLPA and NBPA) restrict that commission an agent can
collect on a player contract. °80 At the same time, none of the un-
ions restrict the commission, fee or wage an agent can collect on
off-the-field contracts, such as marketing, appearances and endorse-
ments.18 Despite these allowances, very few agents charge on any
off-the-field income due to the competitiveness of the agent busi-
ness: a billed client may easily become an ex-client. So while a
player may recoup millions on a disability insurance policy, one
that the agent probably helped him receive, it is unlikely that an
agent would see a dime of that. In addition, many of the disability
insurance policies are based around "career-ending" injuries, which
may persuade a player to retire injured rather than work arduously
for an indefinite return to the game.18 2 There is no commission
from a retired client. 8 3
Governing Agent Certification, Introduction (June 25, 2002) available at http://
www.titlel7.org/scott/NHL.pdf [hereinafter NHLPA Agent Regs] (noting agent
obligations to NHL players); and MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents,
art. IV, §2.B. (Dec. 2, 2005) available at http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/
MLBPARegsPlayerAgents.pdf (stating that agents must act in interest of player).
179. See NFLPA Agent Regs, supra note 158, at §4.B(4) ("A Contract Advisor is
prohibited from receiving any fee for his/her services until and unless the player
receives the compensation upon which the fee is based."); NBPA Regulations Gov-
erning Player Agents (as amended June, 1991) §4.B, available at http://
66.113.231.191/downloads/NBPARegulation.pdf [hereinafter NBPA Agent
Regs] (requiring that any compensation for agent must be after player receives
compensation for which services were provided); NHLPA Agent Regs, supra note
158, at §4.B ("An agent is prohibited from receiving any fee for his services until
and unless the player receives the compensation upon which the fee is based.").
See NFLPA Agent Regs, supra note 158, at §4.B(1) (establishing hat NFLPA's
maximum allowable fee as three percent); see also NBPA Agent Regs, supra note
159, at §4.B (standardizing NBPA's maximum allowable fee to four percent).
180. See NFLPA Agent Regs, supra note 158, at §4.B(1) (in general NFLPA's
maximum allowable fee is 3%; see also NBPA Agent Regs, supra note 159, at §4.B.
(NBPA's maximum allowable fee is 4%)
181. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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Despite these inherent conflicts of interest, agents must and do
help their clients receive disability insurance policies. Due to the
fiercely competitive representation industry, it is paramount at all
times that an agent convince his client that he is doing what is in
the client's best interests.184 In fact, agents may use career-ending
injuries or their knowledge of disability insurance as a talking point
when recruiting potential clients, particularly student-athletes.
One key reason an agent may want to pursue disability insur-
ance policies for his player is to gain leverage in contract negotia-
tions with a team. An agent for a player either still under contract
or not yet a free agent, that does not think he is receiving a fair-
market offer from a team can buy a variety of insurance policies
that will allow the player to play under the last year of his contract, a
franchise tender or a restricted free agent tender, without fear that
he is jeopardizing future earnings. 18 5 If the player never collects
the desired contract, or collects disability insurance instead, he will
have made some portion of the money he thought he was due. 186
Although critics are quick to suggest that agents agree to sub-
par contracts in order to collect commissions, the competitive na-
ture of the agent business does not easily allow for such breaches of
duty. One of the agent's most important tools for recruiting ama-
teur athletes or new clients is their contract history and any agent
with a mediocre resume in that regard faces an uphill battle. As a
result, encouraging a player to buy disability insurance provides an
agent, and most importantly his player, with a degree of comfort
and leverage. 18 7
D. Financial Advisors
Nearly every professional athlete has a financial advisor in addi-
tion to and typically unrelated to their agent. The financial services
market for professional athletes is a lucrative and increasingly com-
petitive one, especially in the NFL.188 Often it is the financial advi-
sor's responsibility to seek out, understand and potentially
negotiate a disability insurance policy for the athlete. In this capac-
ity, financial advisors can potentially do away with the need for
brokers.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Financial Programs and Advisor Administration, (last visited Feb. 26,
2010), http://www.nflpa.com/Member-Services/Resources/Financia-Advisors/
(outlining information on NFLPA's financial advisors).
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Financial advisors are typically paid an annual percentage com-
mission (around 1%) based on the assets under management. 8 9
While an insurance policy does not qualify as an asset under man-
agement, financial advisors charge a commissioned fee based on
the insurance premiums, typically around fifteen percent. 90 As a
result, financial advisors have the same interest as brokers in the
proliferation of insurance policies: an increased market in which
they can charge for their services.
E. NCAA
The NCAA is one of the most oft-criticized sports organiza-
tions.191 While the NFL and NBA have age/eligibility restrictions
which essentially force athletes to attend college, NCAA rules allow
players to be drafted in both MLB and the NHL and still return to
college so long as they did not ask to be drafted and do not subse-
quently sign a professional contract. 19 2 As a result, the NCAA and
its student-athletes can take on an image solely as professionals-in-
waiting. 193
189. See id.
190. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
191. See Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor's New
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA's Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 495, 505-09
(2008) (noting disconnect between NCAA's intended purpose and their actual in-
tentions); Bradley S. Pensyl, Whistling a Foul on the NCAA: How NCAA Recruiting
Bylaws Violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 397, 425-26 (2008)
(concluding that NCAA rules are invalid under Sherman Antitrust Act), William C.
Martin, The Graduate Transfer Rule: Is the NCAA Unnecessarily Hindering Student-Ath-
letes from Traversing the Educational Paths They Desire?, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. LJ.
103, 111-12 (2008) (outlining criticism of NCAA);James Potter, The NCAA as State
Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood and Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1269, 1270-71 (2007)
(arguing that NCAA lacks fairness and sensibility). See also Phillip C. Blackman,
The NCAA's Academic Peformance Program: Academic Reform or Academic Racism, 15
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 225, 287-89 (2008) (comparing effect of APP and APR on stu-
dent athletes with respect to race and noting its unfair tendencies towards educa-
tion); Gabriel A. Morgan, No More Playing Favorites: Reconsidering the Conclusive
Congressional Presumption that Intercollegiate Athletics Are Substantially Related to Educa-
tional Purposes, 81 S. CAL. L. REv 149, 172-76 (2007) (describing academic admis-
sions for student-athletes and lack of good NCAA support in increasing academic
standards for student-athletes).
192. See NFL CBA, supra note 5, at Art. XVI, §2 (stating that three NFL regu-
lar seasons must have passed since player's high school graduation for him to be
eligible for NFL Draft); see also NBA CBA, supra note 5, at Art. X (requiring that at
least one NBA season must have passed since player's high school graduation for
American player to be eligible for NBA Draft); 2009-10 NCAA Division I Manual,
art. 12.2.4 (Aug. 1, 2009), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/
PDF/DlManua9d74aOb2-d10d-4587-8902-b0c781el28ae.pdf (providing rules for
drafting into professional sports).
193. See NFL CBA, supra note 5, at Art. XVI, §2.
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In order to diminish the allure of professional athletics and the
money involved therein, the NCAA relies on its athletes to stay for
the typical duration of college. Outside of increased age and eligi-
bility restrictions and the antitrust lawsuits which would inevitably
follow, the best way for the NCAA to keep its student-athletes as
student-athletes is to help them obtain some sort of insurance pol-
icy to protect them against suffering a career ending injury. By sup-
plying athletes with a financial worst-case scenario similar to that of
many top professional rookies in their sport, it is hoped that stu-
dent-athletes will not feel the need to leave the collegiate ranks as
soon as possible. 194
In addition, the disability insurance programs provide the
NCAA with a needed public relations boost. By subsidizing and fa-
cilitating such a program, the NCAA is more closely looking out for
the best interests of the young men and women participating as
opposed to their own financial coffers, as is often the accusation.
As mentioned earlier, the NCAA started an Exceptional Stu-
dent-Athlete Disability Insurance (ESDI) program in 1990 to help
protect student-athlete's interests against both injury and agents
who might attempt to encourage the student-athlete to leave school
early for professional leagues. The ESDI program began with foot-
ball and men's basketball student-athletes but has since expanded
to include baseball, ice hockey, and women's basketball. 195 Stu-
dent-athletes who have demonstrated that they have the potential
to be selected in the first three rounds of the NFL or NHL drafts, or
the first round of the NBA, MLB or WNBA drafts are eligible for
the program. 196 The policy provides the student-athlete with a
lump sum payment 12 months after it has been determined that
he/she has suffered permanent total disability.1 97 Student-athletes
are eligible for loans to pay the premiums without jeopardizing
their amateur status.1 98
The main advantage of the NCAA's program is that it is a
group program, subsidized by the NCAA's roughly 1,280 member
194. See Morgan, supra note 191 (stating actions taken by NCAA).
195. See Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program: Introduction, (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010) http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM-
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/ connect/ ncaa/NCAA/About+The+NCAA/
Budget+and+Finances/Insurance/exceptional.html (chronicling Exceptional Stu-
dent Disability Insurance program)..
196. See id. (setting forth requirements of eligibility for ESDI).
197. See id. at Permanent Total Disability (PTD) Form (articulating coverage upon
determination of permanent disability).
198. See id. at Premium Financing (noting that payment of loans does not pre-
vent draft into professional sports).
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institutions. As a result, the risk is widely spread and no single insti-
tution is faced with the proposition of a multi-million dollar insur-
ance payout. Costs of the program are shared equally and
therefore are much less expensive than typical private insurance
policies.
The NCAA's ESDI program, administered through HCC Life
Insurance Company, caps coverage at $5 million for projected first-
round NFL draft picks and for men's basketball student-athletes.
Coverage for baseball, men's ice hockey and women's basketball is
capped at $1.5 million, $1.2 million and $250,000 respectively. 199
The premiums cost between ten and twelve thousand dollars for
each one million dollars of coverage, which is a few thousand dol-
lars cheaper than a private policy.200 It is reported that some eighty
to one hundred athletes participate in the ESDI program each year,
and that approximately seventy-five to eighty percent of those are
college football players.201 Further, several prominent student-ath-
letes have enlisted in the NCAA's ESDI program. 20 2
199. See Mike Knobler, Tech Blog: Georgia Tech at Clemson: 7:45 P.M. Saturday *
ESPN, 790 AM; Premium receiver finds coverage, Atlanta J. & Const., Oct. 19, 2006, at
C1 (explaining maximum coverage for ESDI).
200. See Gary Klein, Premium Players: Insurance Policies Are Becoming Standard for
Elite College Athletes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at D1 (reporting rates for insurance
against career-ending injuries).
201. See id. (noting typical ESDI participation).
202. Including 2007 Heisman Trophy winner Florida quarterback Tim
Tebow, #2 overall pick Georgia Tech wide receiver Calvin Johnson, Mike Knobler,
a 2004 first round cornerback from Arkansas, Ahmad Carroll, a 2004 first round
offensive lineman from Arkansas, Roy Wililiams, a first round wide receiver from
Texas, David West, a 2003 first round power forward from Xavier, 1996 second
overall pick UMass center Marcus Camby, 1996 first round pick Villanova shooting
guard Kerry Kittles, 1996 first round pick, Georgia Tech point guard Stephon Mar-
bury, 1994 first round pick, Michigan forwardJuwan Howard, 1994 first round pick
Michigan guardJalen Rose, 1993 first overall pick Michigan forward Chris Webber,
and 1994 second overall pick San Diego State running back Marshall Faulk. See
Report: Tebow Insured for Roughly $2M, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/
story?id=4352538 (last updated July 27, 2009) (reporting on Florida quarterback's
multi-million dollar insurance policy on himself); see also Georgia Tech at Clemson:
7:45 P.M. Saturday * ESPN RADIo, 790 AM (Sept. 29, 2007) (covering game); Pre-
mium Receiver Finds Coverage, THE ATL. JOURNAL-CONST. Oct. 19, 2006, at IC; An-
drews Scott Cain, Athletes Feeling Need for Coverage, AK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Feb. 15,
2004; See Williams Gladly Comes Back; Texas Receiver Figures Playing Another Year
Will Work for Him, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Dec. 18, 2002 at IC; Insurers Play
Talent Scouts for Finest College Athletes; if Players Get Disability Insurance,
They're Considered Pro Material, PHIL. INQ., Jan. 30, 1996, at A01; Sports Shorts (?);
Michigan Sophomores Insured for Million-Plus, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Dec. 19,
1992, at 2C; Ken Davis, Burrell, Baker Play it Safe; Insurance Program Assists Some Pre-
mium Players, HARroRD COUR., Jan. 3, 1993, at C4.
Several other notable student-athletes have been known to have secured pri-
vate policies: former Miami running back and Heisman Trophy finalist Willis Mc-
Gahee; 2005 Heisman winner, USC running back Reggie Bush; 2004 Heisman
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Approximately seventy-five percent of first round picks in the
NFL and NBA are enrolled in the ESDI program.20 3 Participation
among MLB and NHL first round picks may be approximately ten
percent while each year only one or two WNBA first round picks are
enrolled in the ESDI program. 20 4 The fact that WNBA salaries only
range from $35,190 to $99,500 may make the ESDI cost prohibitive
or even unnecessary for women's basketball players.
20 5
In addition to the ESDI program, the NCAA's Catastrophic In-
jury Insurance Program provides coverage to student-athletes, stu-
dent-coaches, student-managers, student-trainers and student-
cheerleaders who are catastrophically injured during a covered
sporting event.20 6 The policy allows for maximum benefits of $20
million with a deductible of $75,000.207 The NCAA contributes ap-
proximately $10 million in annual premiums to the insurance com-
pany as part of the program. 208
winner, USC quarterback Matt Leinart; 2001 first round pick, Miami wide receiver
Santana Moss; 1999 first round pick, Florida defensive endJevon Kearse; 1999 first
overall pick, Kentucky quarterback Tim Couch; 1999 first round pick, Georgia
cornerback Champ Bailey; 1998 first overall pick, Miami third baseman Pat Bur-
rell; 1998 first overall pick, Tennessee quarterback Peyton Manning; 1997 second
overall pick, Florida State outfielder J.D. Drew; 1995 first overall pick, Maryland
forward Joe Smith; and 1986 first round pick, Iowa quarterback Chuck Long. See
Gary Klein, Premium Players: Insurance Policies Are Becoming Standard for Elite College
Athletes. L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at DI; Larry Guest, Culpepper's Next Options May
Be Insurance Policy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 1996, at DI; Andrea Szulszteyn,
The Best Policy: Insurance; More College Athletes Are Signing Up, and Earlier, for Protection
Against Career-ending Injuries, SUN-SENT., Oct. 17, 1999, at ID; Don Markus, Terps'
Smith Gets $1 million Policy, Bait. Sun,June 14, 1994, at IC; Gary Libman, Insurance:
Athletes Hedge Career Bets, THE TIMES MIRROR, July 12, 1985, at 5-1.
203. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
204. See id.
205. See WNBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT Art. V, §§7-8, 32-33, avail-
able at http://www.wnbpa.com/documents/2008WNBACBA.003.pdf [hereinafter
WNBA CBA] (setting forth minimum and maximum player salaries).
206. See NCAA Insurance Programs, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/por-
tal/ncaahome?WCMGLOBALCONTEXT=/ncaa/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/
budget+and+finances/insurance/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010); see also
NCAA Website: Information about Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program, http:/
/www.ncaa.org (follow link to "About the NCAA"; then follow "Budget and Fi-
nances"; then follow "Insurance Programs") (describing program details).
207. See NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Benefit Summary,
NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/a44ffd804eOd55379fe3ffla
d6fc8b25/09-10+CAT+benefit+summary.pdfMOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=
a44ffd804e0d55 379fe3fflad6fc8b25 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (explaining policy
benefits and deductibles).
208. See Lance Pugmire, Staying Put Has Higher Cost; Many Leaving for NFL Be-
cause Colleges Can't Guarantee Players'Financial Futures Through Insurance, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2003, at S1 (defining NCAA contribution to insurance program).
[Vol. 17: p. 473
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F. Private Alternatives to ESDI
For a student-athlete who desires insurance coverage, his or
her best option is generally to choose the NCAA's ESDI program.
There are several scenarios, however, where the student-athlete
would want to use an insurer and purchase a policy outside of the
NCAA program. If the ESDI program rejects the student-athlete,
he or she might then want to look into other private options. One
of the primary qualifications for coverage under the ESDI program
is that the student-athlete projects as a reasonably high draft pick in
his or her professional sport's draft.20 9 Consequently, many stu-
dent-athletes with professional ambitions might not have a suffi-
ciently high projection to qualify for coverage.2 10 Ultimately, that
leaves approximately one hundred and fifty-five drafted players out
of the coverage realm, not to mention the hundreds of undrafted
players who do sign NFL contracts, for example, and have a legiti-
mate chance to make the professional roster.211
A private insurance company may have different guidelines for
coverage than the ESDI, and is more likely to insure late round or
undrafted prospects. In addition, the insurance company may use
or have a different assessment of the student-athletes draft projec-
tion. Nevertheless, draft projections are still an incredibly inexact
science, both for the professional team and the experts like ESPN's
Mel Kiper. It has been shown that NFL roster populations are
equally populated with undrafted free agents as they are with first,
second or third round draft picks. 212 Insurance companies may
also differ on injury evaluations. While one company may decline
to quote based on a previous or potential injury, another may be
willing to provide coverage. In addition, the insurance companies
may also differ on whether they will exclude certain injuries from
coverage. 21 3
Student-athletes may also want to supplement his or her insur-
ance with a private policy because, as discussed earlier, there are
209. See Klein, supra note 202 (stating that most students-athletes do not qual-
ify for ESDI).
210. See id. For example, a college football student-athlete must be projected
into the first three rounds of the seven round NFL draft to enroll in the ESDI. See
id.
211. See id. (including compensatory draft picks).
212. SeeJoe Landers, The Importance of Day One; NFL Two-Deeps Tell Us Where to
Find Talent, OuRLADs SCOUTING SERVICES, Nov. 30, 2007, available at http://
lowdownskinny.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=art.&sid=217&
mode=thread&order=0&thold=0&POSTNUKESID=c9e5a5cbc410cb9e2c219585b7
42259d (last updated Jan. 30, 2008) (explaining composition of NFL rosters).
213. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
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maximum amounts of coverage offered under the NCAA's ESDI
program. If the athlete can demonstrate that he or she has an in-
surable interest greater than the maximum allowed by the NCAA's
ESDI policy then he or she may be able to purchase additional pol-
icy coverage. 214 The athlete can demonstrate this by his or her
likely draft position and the corresponding likely contract
amount.215 The athlete may also be able to demonstrate an addi-
tional insurable interest through potential endorsement money.21 6
Further, although unlikely, is that the athlete is able to find a
less expensive insurance policy than the ESDI program. 217 The rea-
son this is unlikely is that the ESDI program is a group program,
which, as discussed earlier, provides valuable economies of scale,
sharing of administrative costs, and spreading of the risk for the
members of the group (NCAA member institutions). The advan-
tages of the ESDI group program provide for lower premium costs,
almost certainly lower than comparable policies by private insur-
ance companies.21 8
In addition, a student-athlete may prefer the terms of the in-
surance policy contract, as discussed earlier, of the outside com-
pany as compared the NCAA's ESDI program. For example, the
waiting period may be less, or more unlikely, there could be a dif-
ferent definition of a career-ending injury. More likely, however, is
that the added language or terms and conditions are different.2 19
For example, the ESDI policy may exclude from coverage the right
knee based on a previous ACL injury while the private company
214. See id.
215. See id. (providing example of how student-athletes demonstrates high in-
surable interest).
216. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. University of Georgia Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
654 S.E.2d (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (noting other ways student-athlete may be able to
prove insurable interest). During the 2003 college football season, Georgia safety
Decory Bryant began the process to obtain disability insurance under the NCAA's
ESDI program. However, Hoke Wilder, the Georgia athletic department employee
responsible for coordinating the ESDI program, failed to file the proper
paperwork just days before Bryant suffered a career-ending spinal injury in a game.
Bryant brought suit against Georgia and Wilder alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract and negligence. Bryant sought the $500,000 he would have
been due under the policy plus punitive damages. Georgia sought indemnifica-
tion from its insurance company. A Georgia state court dismissed the suit in late
2009 based on sovereign immunity. To avoid further litigation, Georgia and Bry-
ant settled the case in February 2010 for $400,000. See Tim Tucker, Former Bulldog
Awarded $400K; Athletic Association Settles Lawsuit With Injured DB Bryant, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CoNsT., Feb. 25, 2010, at 6C (reporting facts and settlement of suit).
217. For a further discussion regarding the terms of insurance contracts, see
supra notes 116-24.
218. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
219. See id.
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does not. The athlete may prefer, even with a likely higher insur-
ance premium cost, the private insurance company's policy.
G. Leagues
There are two different types of league programs: one for the
benefit of players and the other for the benefit of teams. The NFL,
NBA and the NHL all operate league-administered disability plans
for the benefit of players in cases of permanent total disability.220
These plans are part of the collective bargaining agreements and
require teams to contribute money each year towards post-career
health or disability plans. Some of the plans are optional, yet in
others the players accrue accounts to be used in the case of health
problems under the plans based on their years of experience in the
league.
It is indisputable that a key to success for the Big Four is sus-
tainable fan knowledge and admiration for players and teams. One
important factor in such continuity is the health of the players. The
leagues' success depends very much on the success of its recognized
stars.221 For example, when the NFL announced it was modifying a
rule that would prohibit "a defender on the ground who hasn't
been blocked or fouled directly into the quarterback from lunging
or diving at the quarterback's lower legs," many people took to call-
ing it the "Tom Brady Rule." The Tom Brady Rule was named for
the three-time Super Bowl winning quarterback of the New En-
gland Patriots who missed almost the entire 2008 season because of
an injury incurred in such a manner.222
In recent years, the NFL and NFL Players Association (NFLPA)
have been under intense scrutiny for their disability and pension
plans, which have allegedly left many retired players with insuffi-
220. See NFL CBA, supra note 5, at art. LI; see also NBA CBA, supra note 5, at
art. IV: Benefits, § 5; NHL CBA, supra note 5, at art. 23.
221. See Michael Hiestand, NBA Playoff Ratings Are Looking Up, USA TODAY,
May 26, 2009, at 3C (explaining that 2009 NBA playoff television ratings were up
from previous years, with many contributing boost to playoff performances of
Cleveland Cavaliers' LeBron James and Los Angeles Lakers' Kobe Bryant). In ad-
dition, five of the six highest rated NBA Finals included Michael Jordan of the
Chicago Bulls, one of the world's most famous athletes. The 2009 Stanley Cup
Finals between the Pittsburgh Penguins and the Detroit Red Wings recorded some
of the highest television ratings in years, in large part because of the presence of
Pittsburgh's young stars Sidney Crosby and Evgeni Malkin. See Dan Steinberg, Hot
Series Nets Big TV Ratings, WASH. POST, May 12, 2009, at D04 (emphasizing impor-
tance of star players during playoffs).
222. See Christopher L. Gasper, Brady Rule: Steps Taken to Protect QBs' Knees,
BOsTON GLOBE, Mar. 24, 2009, at C1 (implying that rule protecting quarterback's
legs was result of Tom Brady injury).
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cient health care and benefits.2 23 Ultimately, it is a superior busi-
ness practice for the NFL to ensure the prolonged health and well
being of its players, not only for the health of its players but also to
avoid public relations controversies.2 24 Encouraging and adminis-
tering disability insurance policies and programs for players helps
to achieve these goals.
As mentioned earlier, the NFL does not guarantee much of its
contracts, due in large part to the high injury rates and roster turn-
over in the sport. By encouraging players to insure the un-
guaranteed portions of their contracts, the NFL can maintain its
status quo. 2 25 Effectively, the league and its teams can shift the bur-
den of the player's future earnings to the player and continue to
operate a system that is financially beneficial to the teams and the
league.
There are also league-wide programs for the benefit of the
teams, should they be required to continue paying the contract of a
disabled player, as mentioned earlier in the Mark Teixera and C.C.
Sabathia examples.2 26 These policies generally only cover tempo-
rary total disability. These policies do not have to be collectively
bargained since they do not affect the wages, hours or terms and
conditions of employment of the players.2 27 Consequently, the de-
tails of these programs are less available. It has been reported that
the NBA group program through MetLife insures the top one hun-
dred and fifty salaries in the league but gives MetLife the right to
exclude fourteen players they deem to be high-risk.228
By creating a league-wide program, whereby each team con-
tributes to the premium costs, it allows teams to have insurance cov-
erage where they might otherwise be taking unnecessary risks. In
223. See Brett Edwin LoVellette, "Mortal [Kiombat in Cleats": An Examination of
the Effectiveness of the National Football League's Disability Plan and Its Impact on Retired
Players, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 1101 (2009); A. Jason Huebinger, Beyond the Injured Reserve:
The Struggle Facing Former NFL Players in Obtaining Much Needed Disability Assistance,
16 SPORTS LAw. J. 279 (2009); Bryan Lipsky, Dealing with the NFL's Concussion
Problems of Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 18 FoR,-HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
LJ. 959 (2008).
224. See Lipsky, supra note 225 (detailing how NFL players can lack benefits).
225. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
226. For further discussion on this topic, see supra notes 17-30 and accompany-
ing text.
227. See 9 U.S.C. §158(d). See also United Mine Workers of America v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) and Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
228. See Matt Watson, Insurance Problems May Keep Luol Deng Out of 2012 Olym-
pics, http://nba.fanhouse.com/2008/08/28/insurance-problems-may-keep-loul-
deng-out-of-2012-olympics/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (noting Deng has been ex-
cluded from coverage due to large outstanding money to be paid and back injury).
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the same way that the NCAA is able to spread risk and costs through
its many member institutions, leagues and their member clubs do
the same thing. By administering one collective league program, it
saves teams the costs of purchasing policies for themselves.
H. Teams
As stated earlier, Big 4 teams pay out close to ten billion dollars
annually in player compensation. Yet, despite the massive invest-
ment made in player personnel, it is still a very unsure investment:
the average career in the Big Four ranges from 3.5 to 5.6 years and
the rate of injuries has continually increased. 229 As a result, teams
use disability insurance policies to help protect against the fact that
in most cases, if a highly paid player is injured, the team must still
pay him. As a result, insurance policies help to reduce the risk of
having a large financial obligation. 230
For that same reason, disability insurance can also help reduce
some of the pressure agents may feel to get a long-term, high-in-
come deal done. It can help prevent contract disputes and hold-
outs, situations teams certainly try to avoid. Conceivably, if a player
has a policy that allows him to recover a considerable sum of money
despite not having agreed to a long-term contract, he is less likely to
feel the need to holdout and demand a new contract to the relief of
the team. 23' In addition, teams have no interest in seeing players
hurt and uncompensated. For the same reasons leagues look to
avoid embarrassing situations of disabled alumni, teams should
229. See Dustin Dow, Much Pain, No Gain ?, CINCINNATI. ENQUIRER, July 1,
2007, at IC (providing that average NFL career is about 3.5 years); see also Rob
Hiaasen, Getting All the Breaks; As Head Trainer, Bill Tessendorf Works to Get Sidelined
Ravens Back in the Game, BALT. SUN, Dec. 28, 2002, at ID (emphasizing difficulty in
keeping some players on field); David Parkinson, When the Lights Go Out, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 18, 2008, at 17 (discussing NHL players' difficulty in fi-
nances); Salary Inflation Caused NHL Troubles, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 21, 2004, at C4
(explaining that average NHL career is about five years); Mark Montieth, NBA
Draft - High Hopes, IND. STAR, June 25, 2006, at IC (explaining that average NBA
career is about four years); Desmond Ryan, Basketball Dreamers Come up Against Real-
ity, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 31, 2005, at COI (discussing reality that NBA careers are
often short); Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Career Last? N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2007, at SP6 (concluding that average MLB career is about 5.6 years).
230. See Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Injuries Rise, and Reason Is a Mystery, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2009, at Al (discussing baseball injuries increasing for unknown rea-
son); see also Erik Spanberg, Sidelined! CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 5, 2004, at
11 (detailing amount of injuries found in sports now); Bodychecking Raises Risk of
Concussion, Study Says, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 22, 2003, at S2 (emphasizing
growing frequency of injury problems in four major sports).
231. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
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work to ensure that their players are adequately covered for post-
career health and financial well-being.
An additional area in which teams and leagues have commin-
gled insurance interests is out-of-league competitions, namely the
Olympics, World Baseball Classic or World Cup. These competi-
tions provide a debatable benefit to the leagues and teams certainly
provide plenty of risk to the players and the contracts associated
with those players. 232
Olympic competitions are held entirely outside the control or
direction of the professional sports leagues where athletes are typi-
cally involved, specifically the NBA and NHL. The involvement in
the Olympics has been so important to NHL players that the topic
is included in the NHL CBA.2 33 In addition to the Olympics, many
NHL players also participate in the International Ice Hockey Feder-
ation's (IIHF) World Cup. The IIHF provision in the NHL CBA
explicitly states that Clubs will permit players to participate so long
as the IIHF or the player's national team agrees to insure the re-
maining value of the player's contract and any potential loss of
earning capacity for the player.234 The Olympics provision in the
NHL CBA merely states that the parties will work towards a mutu-
ally agreeable solution and indications have been that the terms
must be the same as other IIHF contests. 235
Additionally, although the NBA's CBA does not specially ad-
dress Olympic participation, basketball players have also had to
reach mutual agreeable arrangements in order to compete for
medals. As mentioned in the previous section, the NBA's group
232. See id.
233. See Shelly Anderson, Sports is Cultural Equalizer, PIrrSBURGH POsT-GA-
ZErE, Apr. 14, 2006, at F2 (discussing significance of Olympics to hockey players).
See NHL CBA, ART. 24, International Hockey 111 (2005), available at http://
www.nhlpa.com/About-Us/CBA/ In addition, one of the NHL's biggest stars,
Washington Capital forward Alex Ovechkin, has said he would risk suspension or
even consider leaving the NHL if it did not agree to let the players play in the 2014
Olympics in Ovechkin's home country of Russia. SeeJeff Klein, Ovechkin Not Waver-
ing On Support of Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at B 1I (detailing Ovechkin's
interest in Olympics).
234. See NHL CBA, supra note 233, at 111 (explaining insurance of players by
national teams).
235. See Greg Wyshynski, Agent: NHL Won't Pay Players Hurt in Olympic Camps,
YAHOO! SPORTS, Aug. 5, 2009, http://sports.yahoo.com/nhl/blog/puck -daddy/
post/Agent-NHL-won-rsquo-t-pay-players-hurt-in-Olymp?urn=nhl,180950 (explain-
ing that in August of 2009 it was reported that NHL would not pay players hurt
during Olympics because of insurance disputes). The problem seems to have at
least been partially resolved as Hockey Canada, the Canadian national team,
agreed to fully cover its players. See NHL.com Staff, Hockey Canada to Fully Cover
Players, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=480104 (indicating
reluctance of national teams to insure players).
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insurance policy allows MetLife to exclude fourteen of the top one
hundred and fifty players from insurance coverage. When the Chi-
cago Bulls and star forward Luol Deng agreed to a seventy one mil-
lion dollar contract prior to the 2008 season, MetLife chose to
exclude coverage of Deng's contract due to a previous back in-
jury.23 6 The exclusion raised concerns about Deng's possible par-
ticipation for Great Britain when London hosts the 2012 Olympics.
The issue was resolved when Great Britain Basketball agreed to pro-
vide insurance coverage for Deng's contract.23 7
Meanwhile, the World Baseball Classic is an international base-
ball tournament sanctioned by the International Baseball Federa-
tion (IBAF) and created by MLB, the MLBPA, Nippon Professional
Baseball (Japan) and the Korean Baseball Organization. 23 8 Conse-
quently, MLB strongly encourages its players to participate. Never-
theless, several major players were unable to participate in the 2009
World Baseball Classic because of insurance issues, including Albert
Pujols and Johan Santana.2s9 In general, teams will want the na-
tional team or governing body to obtain insurance on the player's
contract. If the player is a current free agent, he may have to
purchase his own insurance protecting possible future earnings.
Teams must understandably act prudently and aggressively in
protecting their own interests. For example, after American de-
fender Oguchi Onyewu tore his patellar tendon in a World Cup
qualifier. AC Milan, the team for whom Onyewu played, said it
would demand compensation from the US Soccer Federation for
an injury likely to keep Onyewu sidelined for four months. 240
I. Athletes
In general, contracts in MLB, the NBA and the NHL are guar-
anteed, relieving a player of any concern about the probability of
his future earnings. However, before a player signs a major con-
236. See Watson, supra note 228. (discussing MetLife decision to exclude Deng
and his contract extension from coverage).
237. See id. (outlining solution to issue of insuring Luol Deng at around
$500,000 each summer).
238. See World Baseball Classic Tournament Rules and Regulations, http://
web.worldbaseballclassic.com/about/rues.sp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (describ-
ing organization of World Baseball Classic).
239. See Kevin Baxter, World Baseball Classic is a Mixed Bag, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2009, at C1 (listing players unable to play in WBC due to insurance issues).
240. See Milan to Seek Damages From US After Oguchi Onyewu Injures Knee, THE
GuARnIAN, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/oct/15/mi-
lan-damages-oguchi-onyewu-knee-injury (emphasizing displeasure by European
club at World Cup related injury).
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tract, they most likely have many worries about the possibility of a
major pay day. Considering the injury and success rates in profes-
sional sports, one of the athlete's best tools for protecting them-
selves against the possibility that an injury will derail their career is
disability insurance. Disability insurance can provide a player with
the assurance that they need not rush to accept a subpar contract
offer and can continue to play at maximum effort without fear of a
financially crippling injury.241
Nonetheless, in the sport with the highest injury rate and short-
est careers, the NFL, most of the compensation in a contract is not
guaranteed. 242 Consequently, it is very important that NFL players
consider disability insurance policies to lower the risk associated
with their future earnings.
As discussed earlier, student-athletes should obtain quotes
from both, and compare the costs and maximum amount of insur-
ance coverage provided. The student-athlete who is declined by the
NCAA program (based on ability, projected draft status, injury or
other risk factor) may also want to consider a private insurance pol-
icy. Further, the student-athlete may also want to supplement an
NCAA policy with a private policy, given that the NCAA has maxi-
mum amounts of coverage and, in certain situations, the student-
athlete may have a greater insurable interest. 243
J. Unions
A union, as the exclusive representative of the workers, must,
in good faith, act on behalf of the employees in negotiating the
terms and conditions of employment.244 Fundamentally, a union
exists because of and for the employees and must do whatever it
legally can to protect the interests of those employees. 245 There-
241. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
242. See id.
243. See id. For example, the top overall pick in the NFL or NBA draft, often
has significant off-the-field or off-the-court value in marketing and endorsements,
thereby justifying more insurance. See id.
244. See Chaffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 561 (1990) (explaining role of union and ways for employees to seek reme-
dies from them).
245. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a) (describing general union duties); see also
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
The National Labor Relations Act has been interpreted to impose 'duty
of fair representation' (DFR) on labor unions, which union breaches
when its conduct toward member of bargaining unit is arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or in bad faith; this duty extends to challenges leveled not only at
union's contract administration and enforcement efforts but at its negoti-
ation activities as well.
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fore, for many of the same reasons that it makes sense for players to
obtain disability insurance policies, it makes sense for the unions to
encourage players to take out such policies, namely to ensure the
long-term financial well-being of the athlete.
As part of the CBAs, the unions are responsible for negotiating
and monitoring retirement and insurance benefits.246 As a result, it
is ultimately the union's responsibility to promote and ensure the
physical and financial health of its player-members. Nevertheless,
the case could be made that the unions, particularly the NFLPA,
have not made a major issue out of disability and retirement bene-
fits. By encouraging player-members to instead take out disability
insurance policies on their own, it shifts the burden of protection to
the player. 247 As a result the union might not have to consider it a
major issue of contention during the collective bargaining process.
VII. THE GRAY AREA- LITIGATION
There are very few cases involving athlete disability insurance
policies that have not resulted in a settlement. The majority of disa-
bility insurance disputes are settled or resolved in arbitration and
the results of those decisions do not become public.248 As a result,
it is quite difficult for those not working in the insurance field to
have a good grasp of the expected costs, payouts or rejection rates
with regards to disability insurance policies. The few litigated cases
discussed below are important because they show the type of issues
that can be raised during disability insurance disputes.
A. Misrepresentation by Athlete or Pre-Existing Conditions
In Boston Mutual v. New York Islanders, Brett Lindros was drafted
as the ninth overall pick in the 1994 NHL Draft, the younger
brother of then-emerging star and the 1991 1st overall pick Eric
Lindros of the Philadelphia Flyers. 249 A few months later, the Is-
landers submitted an application to Boston Mutual Insurance Com-
pany to insure Lindros for temporary total disability as part of the
Id.
246. NFLPA - Our History, http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/ (last visited
July 30, 2009) and About the NBPA, available at http://www.nbpa.org/about-us (last
visited July 30, 2009).
247. See HCC Specialty Underwriters, supra note 81.
248. See id.
249. See Boston Mutt. Ins. Co. v. New York Islanders Hockey Club, L.P., 165
F.3d 93 (lst Cir. 1999) (addressing that insurance companies are not responsible
to make sure applications are filled out correctly).
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NHL's group insurance plan.2 50 As part of the application, the Is-
landers filled out a detailed medical history on Lindros. 251 The ap-
proved application failed to disclose that Lindros had suffered
three fairly serious concussions in the previous year and that he had
received medical care for them. 252
Lindros began playing for the Islanders in the spring of 1995.
From that time through November 1995, Lindros suffered three
more serious concussions.253 When Lindros was forced to retire
later that year, "the Islanders filed a claim under the insurance pol-
icy, seeking to recover approximately $4.3 million - the bulk of Lin-
dros' salary for the period remaining in his five-year contract
term."25 4 Under the policy, Boston Mutual would reimburse the
team for eighty percent of Lindros's salary during his disability
once the Islanders met the deductible and he missed thirty consec-
utive regular season games because of the disability.2 55 Boston Mu-
tual denied the claim on the grounds that the Islanders failed to
reveal Lindros's three previous concussions, which it deemed rele-
vant information on the initial insurance application. 256
Boston Mutual filed suit to rescind the policy, and was granted
summary judgment in Massachusetts District Court.257 Under Mas-
sachusetts law, an insurance company can void a policy based on
misrepresentation of the insured if one of two prongs are met
under Massachusetts state insurance law: (1) the misrepresentation
or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive or (2) the matter
either misrepresented or increased the risk of loss. 258 The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court decision de novo to
determine if either of the prongs was met.259
The circuit court affirmed the holding of the district court.260
First, it found that the Islanders conduct was "indisputably reckless"
and "careless in the extreme." The Court then considered whether
250. See id. at 94 (providing insurance application process for Brett Lindros).
251. See id. at 95 (explaining detailed medical reporting required in insur-
ance application process).
252. See id. (indicating that Islanders failed to disclose certain information).
253. See id. (depicting mounting number of concussions).
254. See id. (describing Islanders' attempt at making insurance claim on
Lindros).
255. See id. (explaining insurance policy provisions).
256. See id. (describing reasoning for denial of insurance claim).
257. See id. at 96 (presenting origins of lawsuit to reclaim policy).
258. See id. (detailing Massachusetts law in regard effect of misrepresentation
by insured (citing Mass. Gen Laws ch. 175 § 186 (1998)).
259. See id. (setting forth standard of review).
260. See id. at 99 (affirming lower court decision).
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the Islanders misrepresentation was material as a matter of Massa-
chusetts's insurance law to warrant the lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the insurance company. 261 Although the
Islanders claimed that Boston Mutual would have underwritten the
same policy had Lindros's past concussions been disclosed, 262 the
court held that Massachusetts law "does not go so far as to require
proof by the insurer that it would have acted differently." 263 Also,
though the determination as to whether a misstatement on an in-
surance form increases the insurer's risk of loss is normally a ques-
tion of fact, Massachusetts law allows such an issue to be resolved as
a matter of law if "the health condition or occurrence falsely con-
cealed is objectively serious enough that no reasonable person
could doubt that it increased the risk of loss."264 Considering that
the Islanders' own expert witness doctor admitted that a history of
concussions increases the health risks to those players, the First Cir-
cuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that the misrepresenta-
tions were material and increased the risk of loss to Boston
Mutual.2 6
5
B. Statute of Limitations for Claims: Smagala v. Owen266
After two mostly unproductive seasons with the Dallas Cow-
boys, Stanley Smagala, a defensive back, signed with the Pittsburgh
Steelers prior to the 1992 season. 267 Smagala signed a one-year
deal with a base salary of $160,000 and a signing bonus for
261. See id. at 97 (agreeing with district judge based on facts of case). "A false
answer is material if the matter misrepresented increased the risk of loss' for the
insurer." Id. (citing § 186). Discussing the Massachusetts standard for "actual in-
tent to deceive," the court stated:
In general, a false answer does not itself automatically prove deceitful
intent- the mistake could easily be a reasonable one or merely negligent.
At the other end of the spectrum, a false statement in an insurance pol-
icy, known by the applicant to be untrue and deliberately intended to
induce reliance on the false statement, indicates actual deceit.
Id. at 96 (reviewing standard for intent to deceive under Massachusetts state law
(citing Danca v. Taunton Savings Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1129 (Mass. 1982)).
262. See id. at 98-99 (determining whether "the increased risk should be disre-
garded if, as the Islanders claim to be true, the insurers would in fact have issued
the same policy for Lindros, without any exclusion, and without any change in
premium, even if they had known all of the information about the prior
concussions.").
263. Id. at 97 (discussing standards for materiality).
264. Id.
265. See id. at 99 ("Under Massachusetts law, it is enough that the application
was false in substantial respects and that the information omitted did materially
increase the risk to the insurer.").
266. Smagala v. Owen, 717 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
267. See id. at 493-94 (noting Smagala's team employers).
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$22,500.268 Following his signing Smagala purchased a personal ac-
cident insurance policy from Colin Owen, an agent for Lloyd's of
London at a cost of $2,532.269 As part of the policy, Smagala could
only recover for "permanent total disablement," defined as the "to-
tal physical inability to engage in his occupation .. , for twelve con-
tinuous months." 270 In addition, the policy stated that no claim
could be made until "permanent total disablement" had been estab-
lished and that no lawsuit could be filed more than three years after
permanent total disability had been established. 271
On August 17, 1992, Smagala injured his right knee during a
preseason game. 272 Smagala underwent arthroscopic surgery about
a week later but was unable to play during the 1992 season. 273 Sma-
gala underwent surgery again before the 1993 season but returned
to Steelers training camp in 1993.274 When Smagala continued to
have knee problems and pulled a hamstring, he was cut by the
Steelers on August 23, 1993.275 At a March 1994 tryout in front of
NFL scouts, Smagala ran a 4.6 second forty-yard dash, not a time
befitting a top defensive back in the NFL.276 Unable to land a job,
Smagala filed for payment with Lloyd's but was denied.277 Smagala
filed suit on December 31, 1996 alleging breach of contract.278 An
Illinois trial court granted Lloyd's motion to dismiss and Smagala
appealed. 279
268. See id.
269. See id. at 493. The policy was effetive from June 15, 1992 to July 21, 1993.
Id.
270. Id. at 493.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 494 (commenting that Smagala injured himself playing for
Pittsburgh).
273. See id. ("As a result [of his injury] plaintiff was unable to play football
during the 1992 season."); see also Around the NFL Camps American Conference, AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 25, 1992, at E3 (listing injuries to various players in
preseason workouts as well as mentioning Smagala's arthroscopic surgery on his
left knee).
274. See Smagala, 717 N.E.2d at 494. Smagala also underwent rehabilitation
therapy prior to the 1993 season. See id.
275. See id. (noting Smagala's brief injury-plagued tenure with Pittsburgh).
276. See id. ("Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that 4.39 seconds is the
standard time for a person in the position of defensive cornerback to run the 40-
yard dash."). Smagala never was again able to run a 4.39 seconds 40-yard dash
following his injury and rehabilitation. Id.
277. See id. Lloyd's of London refused to pay Smagala as required by his in-
surance policy. See id.
278. See id. The breach of contract complaint alleged that Lloyd's "failed to
perform its obligations under the insurance policy." Id.
279. See id. Lloyd's motion to strike and dismiss Smagala's complaint was
based on three rationales: Smagala's disability did not occur within a year of the
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Smagala contended that his permanent total disablement did
not begin until March 13, 1994 when he failed at the NFL tryout. 280
This date would have given Smagala until March 13, 1997 to file suit
against Lloyd's. However, the appellate court found that the date
of permanent total disablement was August 17, 1993, one year after
Smagala's injury and the last time he successfully played in the
NFL.2 81 Consequently, Smagala needed to file suit by August 17,
1996, over four months before Smagala actually filed suit. Smagala
urged the court to follow the common law discovery rule, which
states that the "the statute of limitations begins to run when a party
knows or reasonably should know that an injury has occurred."282
Finding the language of the contract to be "clear and unambigu-
ous," the appellate court affirmed the defendant's motion to
dismiss.283
C. Is it a Career-Ending Injury?
1. Underwriters v. Ryche1284
On December 17, 1998, Colorado Avalanche left wing Warren
Rychel broke his hand during a fight with Murray Baron of the Van-
couver Canucks.2 85 As a result of the injury, Rychel was unable to
make a tight fist.28 6 Consequently, Rychel claimed that no team in
the NHL was interested in signing him. 287 Rychel subsequently
filed a claim with Lloyd's of London, with whom he had a profes-
sional athlete disability insurance policy.28 8 Pursuant to the policy,
injury, Smagala's complaint was not filed within the applicable policy period, and
Smagala failed to give Lloyd's notice of his injury. Id.
280. See id. at 495 (discussing Smagala's first notice of disability).
281. See id. at 496 ("Plaintiff's inability to perform as defensive cornerback for
the Pittsburgh Steelers after surgery and therapy during the year after the injury
should have put him on notice that he suffered from a permanent total disabil-
ity."). The court further pointed out that Smagala did not play professional foot-
ball again after being released by Pittsburgh in August 1993. See id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 126 P.3d 234 (Colo.Ct. App. 2005) (ruling that benefits are entitled only
for unexpected events).
285. See Howard Pankratz, NHL Appeals Court Denies Rychel Former Av Claimed
Lloyd's of London Failed to Pay Insurance Policy, DENVER POST, July 1, 2005 at D-06
(reporting cause of Rychel's injury).
286. See Rychel, 126 P.3d at 234-36 (stating Rychel argued that his role was as
an "enforcer," requiring him to play physical and engage in occasional fights, thus
his inability to fight adequately was his disablement).
287. See id. ("Underwriters denied the claim and filed a complaint for declara-
tory relief, seeking a determination that Rychel is not entitled to benefits under
the policy.").
288. See id. (explaining terms of insurance policy).
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Rychel was eligible for coverage should he sustain an injury that was
caused by an accident and resulted in permanent total disable-
ment.289 Lloyd's denied the claim, and filed for declaratory relief
that Rychel was not entitled to benefits under the policy.290
Lloyd's argued, and the trial court agreed by granting it sum-
mary judgment, that neither a fight nor an injury resulting from a
fight were unexpected events triggering coverage under the policy
because of self-proclaimed enforcer role.291 In the previous six sea-
sons, Rychel had been in a total of thirty-three fights. 29 2 Rychel,
however, argued that the relevant event and cause of the injury was
actually his hand getting caught in his opponent's sweater, which is
an unexpected event in a hockey fight.293 Rejecting this assertion,
the court of appeals held that the "injury was caused by the fight,
and the fight was not unexpected. '" 2
9 4
2. Mitchell v. Ace American Insurance Company
295
Donald Mitchell, a cornerback from Southern Methodist was
drafted in the fourth round of the 1999 NFL Draft by the Tennes-
see Titans. In March of 2003, Mitchell signed a three-year, $2.6 mil-
lion deal with the Dallas Cowboys. 296 A month later, Mitchell
289. See id. (stating policy as defining "accident" as "single, sudden, and unex-
pected event, which occurs at an identifiable time and place and which causes
unexpected [b]odily [i]njury at the time it occurs.").
290. See id. (noting Underwriters' sale of disability insurance policy to
Rychel).
291. See id. (explaining trial court's rationale for granting Lloyd's motion for
summary judgment).
292. See Pankratz, supra note 287 (describing Rychel's history of on-ice fights).
293. See Rychel, 126 P.3d at 236 (arguing that "a legitimate inference is that he
was hurt in an unexpected event and that summary judgment [by the trial court]
was improper because there is a genuine issue of material fact"). Specifically,
Rychel argued that the policy's term "event" meant "only the precise moment
when his hand became tangled in the opponent's sweater and does not refer to the
general circumstances immediately preceding that moment." Id. The pertinent
section of the policy stated:
In the event that the insured sustains Bodily Injury caused in and of itself
by an Accident occurring during the Policy Period and which, solely and
independently of any other cause, results in the Total Disablement di-
rectly culminating in the Permanent Total Disablement of the insured
and providing the Total Disablement commenced within six (6) months
of the date of such Accident, then the Insurer agrees to pay the benefits,
stated in the Schedule, to the insured.
Id. at 235.
294. Id. at 237-38 (holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact
and affirming trial court decision).
295. 265 Fed. Appx. 420 (5th Cir. 2008).
296. Sports Log; After Losing Coles, Jets Get Conway, Boston Globe, Mar. 21, 2003,
at E2 (noting Mitchell's signing with Dallas).
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purchased a one-year one million dollars athlete individual disabil-
ity income policy from Ace.29 7 Mitchell injured his left ankle during
an August 28th preseason game and was placed on injured reserve,
missing the entire 2003 season. 298
On July 30, 2004, at the start of Cowboys' training camp, Mitch-
ell signed an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Medical Information
in which he declared that he was "not [at that time] suffering from
any physical and/or mental disability" that prevented him from
playing football. 29 9 Afterjust three days of training camp, however
Mitchell said he had pain in his ankle. 300 He played through the
pain but was cut from the team at the end of training camp. 30 1
Upon being cut, Mitchell signed a medical waiver stating that "he
[was] not [at that time] suffering from any disability, physical or
mental, incurred as a result of his service as a professional football
player for the Club."30 2
After his release from the Cowboys, Mitchell consulted a foot
and ankle specialist who told Mitchell that he could not play profes-
sional football as a result of his ankle condition. 30 3 On September
22, 2004, Mitchell filed for disability benefits with Ace. 30 4 Ace de-
nied the claim and Mitchell brought suit in February 2006.305 Pur-
suant to Mitchell's policy, to be eligible for benefits, he must have
been "Totally Disabled for [twelve months] and certified to be Per-
manently Totally Disabled at the end of the [twelve months] ."306
297. See Mitchell, 265 Fed. Appx. 420 (revealing that team physician released
Mitchell and his ability to play from June 5, 2004 to June 11, 2004).
298. See id. at 421-22 (discussing circumstances surrounding injury and noting
that medical staff of Cowboys noted injury to be "acute posterior tibial tendinitis").
299. Id.
300. See id. (explaining Mitchell's recurrent pain).
301. See id. (providing Mitchell's dismissal). Mitchell, with a tentative roster
spot, practiced and played in preseason games through the pain, though he says
the injury hindered his performance. Id.
302. Id. In addition, the waiver stated that, so far as Mitchell could deter-
mine, "he [was] not physically unable to play professional football for the Club as a
result of any injury suffered during the period of employment with the Club." Id.
303. See id. (noting that based on outside knowledge he was unable to con-
tinue play).
304. See id. (providing Mitchell's benefits claim).
305. See id. (providing facts of Mitchell's benefit denial). Eventually, after the
case was removed to federal district court, all of Mitchell's claims were dismissed in
May of 2007. Mitchell appealed the breach of contract claim to the Fifth Circuit.
Id.
306. Id. at 423. The policy defined "Totally Disabled" as "the Insured's com-
plete and total physical inability as a result of the Accidental Bodily Injury or Sick-
ness or Disease to Participate, as defined in the Policy, in his or her Occupation
.... "Participation under the policy included being "dressed (in uniform) or avail-
able or physically able to practice or play for a team in the League .......
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Ace argued that Mitchell was not "Totally Disabled" within the
meaning of the policy because he did participate in football activi-
ties with the Cowboys, notably mini-camp, training camp and
preseason games, during the twelve-month period following the ini-
tial injury.307 In the end the court agreed with Ace's position and
upheld the denial of coverage. 3°s
D. Returning After a Career-Ending Injury - Darius Miles
(NBA) 309
Darius Miles was the third overall pick in the 2000 NBA Draft
by the Los Angeles Clippers. Prior to the 2004-05 season, Miles
signed a six-year, $48 million contract with the Portland Trailblaz-
307. See id. (detailing Ace's argument).
308. See id. (providing holding of Fifth Circuit). In addition, Mitchell claimed
that he was still eligible for coverage because he did not satisfy the requirements of
the Rehabilitation clause. See id. The Rehabilitation clause stated that Mitchell
would be deemed fully recovered from an injury and hence ineligible for a claim if
he signed a new professional contract and passed the team physical or participated
in four regular season or playoff games in the twelve month period following the
injury. See id. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that "[t]he purpose of the reha-
bilitation clause is to restrict, not to enlarge, the scope of coverage by providing
more ways in which claims may be denied .... Id.
309. See, e.g., Adrian Wojnarowski, Jayson Leery of Those On His Side, THE
RECORD, Mar. 13, 2000, at S1 (explaining Jayson Williams broken leg and rupture
of right knee and attempts of Nets General Manager Don Casey to get him on
court). If Williams played and permanently injured his leg, Williams would lose
out on the rest of his guaranteed contract. See id. (explaining option to sacrifice
his body for playoffs). Also, a proposed waiver would have removed the obligation
of the Nets to continue to pay twenty-percent of Williams' remaining salary with
insurance covering the rest. See id. (noting option to free Nets from liability).
Williams never agreed to the waiver and never played in the NBA again. See id.
(revealing ultimate outcome of situation). Consequently, when Williams officially
retired in June of 2000, after having missed the entire 1999-2000 season, insurance
began to pay eighty percent of his remaining salary. See Bob Considine, Agreement
In Place for Nets' Williams to Leave, USA TODAY, June 27, 2000, at 1OC (revealing
William's will get paid remainder and insurance will reimburse Nets for significant
portion). In April 2003, Williams was convicted of multiple obstruction of justice
charges as well as aggravated manslaughter stemming from the accidental shooting
death and attempted cover-up by Williams of limousine driver Gus Christofi in
February 2002. See Robert Hanley, Williams Guilty of Cover-Up, But Not of
Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at BI (noting factual situation; however,
greater extent not necessary for discussion here). Nevertheless, what is relevant is
that in January of 2005, after the expiration of his Nets contract, the 36 year-old
Williams took the first step in an NBA comeback when he played nine minutes
with the Idaho Stampede of the CBA. See Darren Rovell, Insurance Companies Could
Seek Repayment, ESPN, Jan. 13 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/
story?id=1966345 (suggesting possible return of Williams and discussion regarding
whether or not Williams return to NBA, which never materialized, would have
required him to return some money to either Nets or insurance company).
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ers.3 1 0 Miles had surgery on his injured right knee in December of
2005, but returned that season after missing thirty-four games. 31 1
Miles had microfracture surgery on the knee in November of 2006
and missed the entire 2006-07 and 2007-08 seasons. 312 In April
2008, Miles was examined by an independent doctor who deemed
that Miles' injuries were career-ending. 3 13 As a result, the Blazers
subsequently waived Miles with two years and eighteen million dol-
lars remaining on his guaranteed contract.3 14 As a condition of the
Blazers' salary cap credit, Miles could not play in ten or more games
in any one season during the remaining term of his contract.3 15
Nevertheless, Miles played in six preseason games with the Bos-
ton Celtics prior to the 2008-09 season before being released. Miles
subsequently signed with the Memphis Grizzlies and played two
games for them in December before being released again.3 16 With
Miles two games away from nullifying the Blazers' salary cap credit,
the Blazers sent an email to NBA general managers warning that
the franchise would "safeguard its rights, including, without limita-
tion, litigation," should a team sign Miles solely to negatively impact
the Blazers' salary cap and luxury tax threshold. 317 Fearing collu-
sion charges, the NBA stressed that Miles was a free agent, though
the NBPA did still file a grievance.3 1 8
The Grizzlies ignored the Blazers' threat and signed Miles to a
ten-day contract and eventually signed him for the remainder of
310. SeeJason Quick, Miles Gets $48 Million, No Promises, THE OREGONIAN, Sept.
2, 2004, at DOI (noting Miles stated "[i]t's more than I thought I could get when
the season ended").
311. See Jason Quick, Miles: Says He Was "Fallback Guy" Last Season, Too, THE
OREGONIAN, Apr. 21, 2006, at COI (revealing injury and noting Miles' belief that he
became franchise's scapegoat and that he was rushed into playing after injury).
312. See Joe Freeman, Blazers Send NBA a Warning, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 10,
2009 (noting period of time missed by Trail Blazer's once starting forward).
313. See id. (discussing independent doctor evaluation from April 2008).
314. See id. (highlighting benefit to Trail Blazers that Miles' salary would not
be counted toward salary-cap since injury was career-ending); see also 2005 NBA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art. VII, §6(c), at 162-66, available at http://
www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ART.%20VII.pdf (revealing exceptions to salary
cap for disabled players).
315. See Freeman, supra note 314 (providing terms that must be followed ena-
bling Trail Blazer's to receive salary cap credit).
316. See id. (explaining Miles' participation on Celtic's training camp and ex-
hibition games).
317. See id. (emphasizing that Miles' signed with Grizzlies after no other inter-
est and that he also served ten game suspension after his violation of NBA drug
policy).
318. See Marc J. Spears, Blazers Threaten Lawsuit, Union Grieves E-mail About
Signing Miles, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2009, at C5 (reporting that Player's Associa-
tion filed grievance with Trail Blazers due to threatening email).
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the season. 319 Miles wound up playing thirty-four games for the
Grizzlies during the 2008-09 season, averaging three and a half
points per game and counting nine million dollars against the Blaz-
ers' salary cap.320
E. Proximate Cause Injuries: Cam Neely (NHL)
Cam Neely was one of Boston's most popular sports figures in a
Bruins career that spanned from 1986 through 1996 and an NHL
career that dated back to 1983. Neely captained the Bruins to two
Stanley Cup appearances but his career was derailed by numerous
leg injuries that limited him to only 162 games over his final five
seasons.
Neely retired following the 1995-96 season due $2.7 million in
1996-97 salary and $1.6 million in 1997-98.321 Prior to the 1995-96
season, the Bruins executed a disability insurance agreement with
Boston Mutual Life, whereby Boston Mutual would pay 80% of
Neely's salary if he were to become disabled. The policy partially
excluded coverage for any injury relating to Neely's previously in-
jured left knee. Ultimately, it was injuries to Neely's hips that
forced him out of the lineup in February 1996. The Bruins alleged
that Boston Mutual and its partners attempted to add a hip exclu-
sion in March 1996, after an agreement had already been
reached. 322 Boston Mutual contended that the September offer
was made contingent on receiving further information regarding
Neely's hip condition, which would have allowed them to apply ex-
clusions where appropriate. 323 The disagreement resulted with the
Bruins suing Boston Mutual and two other insurance companies for
319. See Grizzlies Ignore Blazers' Warning, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2009, at
C4 (showing Grizzlies' disregard for Trail Blazer's threat to sue and insist on his
benefit to franchise); see also Grizzlies Sign Miles For Rest of Season, WASH. POST, Jan.
31, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/art./2009/01/30/
AR2009013003561.html (communicating decision to sign for remainder of season
and further explaining that Miles' return but Trail Blazers on hook for remaining
contract price)..
320. See Grizzlies Sign Miles For Rest of Season, supra note 319. (summarizing
result of Mile's return).
321. See Nancy L. Marrapese, Club Files Lawsuit Over Neely Insurance Coverage,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1997, at E9 (discussing remainder left on contract prior to
retirement).
322. See id. (revealing allegations of lawsuit explaining that late exclusions to
policy were improper).
323. See id. (explaining terms of offer).
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their failure to pay Neely, and the parties ultimately settled out of
court with terms undisclosed. 324
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is important for anyone working in the sports industry to
have a good, overall understanding on how insurance works, the
process and the options. Ultimately, it is a business decision for all
of the impacted parties. And this particular specialty niche of insur-
ance is driven by both the statistics and the market.
It is important to bear in mind that this area of insurance is
relatively new, and has changed and evolved considerably through-
out its short history. League programs and the NCAA and ESDI
programs have only come into existence in the last twenty-five years.
As a result, the most important factor to consider is not how this
specialty area of insurance has evolved but rather how it will con-
tinue to evolve. As sports disability insurance policies become more
ubiquitous, the data and pricing models will become more accu-
rate, predictable and stable. Nevertheless, it is important for peo-
ple in the industry to keep up with developments as changes will be
made to address market conditions, to address the needs of ath-
letes, teams and leagues, to address changes in medical issues and
rehabilitation and return from injuries and litigation decisions.
324. See id. (acknowledging counter arguments and explaining that policy ini-
tially made was pending hip condition details).
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